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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article is about finding the right venue for fair use
reform, a subject it approaches through a critique of recent
legislative reform proposals. Fair use is possibly the most
important doctrine in all of copyright. As such, it has attracted
a large volume of critical commentary. Some of the commentary
is in the familiar tradition of doctrinal scholarship—advising
judges how best to interpret the fair use doctrine. But there is
© 2015 Sepehr Shahshahani
* Ph.D. candidate, Department of Politics, Princeton University. I owe a
special thank you to Kathy Strandburg for her guidance and her contributions
to the manuscript. I am also indebted to Barton Beebe, Jeanne Fromer, Lewis
Kornhauser, and Chris Sprigman for helpful discussions and comments. Last
but not least, I would like to thank the editors of the Minnesota Journal of
Law, Science & Technology for their diligence in getting this Article to press.
274 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 16:1
also another trend, increasingly prominent, that focuses on
legislative reforms. This school of scholarship criticizes the fair
use doctrine for providing too little certainty to users of
copyrighted works and second-generation creators. To reduce
this uncertainty it proposes a variety of solutions, such as
promulgating rules to replace the governing standard or setting
up special purpose administrative entities that would require
congressional action. This Article criticizes proposed legislative
reforms of fair use for being unrealistic. It argues that these
proposals often contrast the present state of the law with a
vision of the ideal state of affairs, but pay no attention to
whether this nirvana vision has any chance of realization. They
ignore real-world constraints, such as institutional dynamics
that bear on the feasibility and desirability of their proposed
reforms. Because they bear no relation to the reality of
copyright legislation, the legislative solutions are destined to
fail. My aim is not to dispute the desirability of the critics’
ultimate objectives but rather to show, assuming the ends are
desirable, that the critics’ proposed means are either futile or
counterproductive. I argue that the federal courts are more
hospitable than Congress to pro-user fair use reform, and that
doctrinal scholarship is more fruitful than proposing ideal-type
legislation.
The section following this introduction reviews some
common critiques and proposed reforms of fair use. Section III
situates the reform proposals within the broader discourse
about rules versus standards, highlighting the role of
institutions. I then analyze some of the important real-world
considerations that are absent from many reform proposals,
focusing in particular on public choice problems in Congress.
This section demonstrates that the same institutional
dynamics that make a mess out of current copyright law would
prevent Congress from enacting any of the reformists’
proposals for fixing fair use.
Section V discusses two considerations that could qualify
the conclusion that the fair use critics’ reform proposals are
practically hopeless. Namely, I consider whether fair use
constitutes one of the few pockets of resistance to copyright
expansion, and whether the recent defeat of the Stop Online
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Piracy Act (SOPA)1 and the Preventing Real Online Threats to
Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act
(PIPA)2 heralds a fundamental shift in the balance of power.
These considerations, I conclude, do not change the basic
conclusion that scholarly efforts to find legislative solutions to
fair use problems have been misguided.
Having concluded that the project of proposing legislative
solutions is futile, I proceed in Section VI to consider more
productive ways of reforming fair use. I review a variety of non-
legislative avenues of reform, focusing in particular on the
federal courts. There are many commonsense practical
strategies and tactics—already employed by certain public
interest organizations and law professors—for improving fair
use through litigation. On a scholarly level, I suggest that good
old doctrinal scholarship is more promising than scholars’
proposals for legislation. That promise becomes brighter still
when one considers that recent Supreme Court caselaw, though
mostly a setback to advocates of copyright reform, leaves the
door open to useful and innovative scholarship by allowing that
fair use is of constitutional import. The suggestion to pursue
reform through litigation is not likely to be uncontroversial. So
I discuss philosophical and practical objections to extensive
judicial rulemaking in copyright, particularly on a
constitutional level, but I find them wanting.
Because this Article often adopts a critical attitude, it is
important to note that its criticism is not all-encompassing or
unqualified. The efforts of copyright scholars, on both the
academic and advocacy fronts, should be credited for raising
public awareness of the sorry state of copyright law and
occasionally for helping to bring about better outcomes on the
ground. Nor does the present critique apply to all forms of fair
use scholarship. It targets only one school of fair use criticism—
but a school prominent enough, I think, to be worthy of
separate discussion. Ultimately, the hope is that a critical
examination of the work of scholars, most of whom share the
same priorities in seeking to improve fair use law, can help to
1. Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011); see infra Part
V.B.
2. Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of
Intellectual Property Act, S. 968, 112th Cong. (2011); see discussion infra Part
V.B.
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sharpen our understanding of the role of three institutions—
the legislature, the courts, and the academy—in copyright
reform.
II. FAIR USE AND ITS CRITICS
Fair use is a judge-made doctrine, usually traced to Justice
Story’s opinion in the 1841 case of Folsom v. Marsh,3 and
codified since 1976 in § 107 of the Copyright Act.4 It says that a
“fair” use of a copyrighted work, as defined by reference to four
statutory factors and a preamble, does not constitute copyright
infringement.5 The burden is on the defendant to prove that his
use was fair.6 Fair use is applicable across the board in
3. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). The
origins in English law go further back. See Matthew Sag, The Prehistory of
Fair Use, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1371, 1372–73 (2011). The tendency to credit
Folsom for creating fair use has been criticized. See, e.g., L. Ray Patterson,
Folsom v. Marsh and Its Legacy, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 431, 431 (1998) (calling
it a “myth” that “Folsom created fair use”). My concern here, however, is not
with tracing fair use’s history or historiography but rather with rehearsing
some basic common ground about what the doctrine is and where it comes
from.
4. The 1976 Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 107, 90 Stat. 2541
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012)).
5. The provision, 17 U.S.C. § 107, reads as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use
of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or
phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research,
is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use
made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be
considered shall include—
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of
fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above
factors.
Id.
6. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994)
(describing fair use as an affirmative defense).
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copyright, and plays a critical role in balancing the interests of
copyrightholders and users.7 As such, fair use has attracted an
enormous volume of commentary.8
One prominent strand in this commentary accuses fair use
of being too vague.9 It argues that the principle of fairness is so
diffuse, the four non-exclusive factors are so unhelpful, and the
caselaw is so all over the place that a would-be user can form
no accurate idea of whether his contemplated use is fair.10 This
lack of predictability is anathema to the purpose of copyright in
7. E.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
479 (1984) (“The fair use doctrine must strike a balance between the dual
risks created by the copyright system: on the one hand, that depriving authors
of their monopoly will reduce their incentive to create, and, on the other, that
granting authors a complete monopoly will reduce the creative ability of
others.”).
8. See, e.g., Jay Dratler, Jr., Distilling the Witches’ Brew of Fair Use in
Copyright Law, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 233 (1988); William W. Fisher III,
Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659 (1988); Wendy
J. Gordon, Fair Use As Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of
the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982); Pierre
N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990);
Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1525 (2004); L. Ray Patterson, Understanding Fair Use, 55 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 249 (1992); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair’s Fair: A Comment on
the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1137 (1990). Other works are cited
throughout.
9. See, e.g., NEILWEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 66 (2008)
(noting that fair use’s “open-ended, case-specific cast and inconsistent
application [make it] exceedingly difficult to predict whether a given use in a
given case will qualify . . . .”).
10. See id.; see also Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV.
1087, 1087 (2007) (“The doctrine’s context sensitivity renders it of little value
to those who require reasonable ex ante certainty about the legality of a
proposed use.”); Fisher, supra note 8, at 1693 (“[T]he disarray of the doctrine
impairs the ability of the creators and users of intellectual products to
ascertain their rights and to adjust their conduct accordingly.”); Leval, supra
note 8, at 1107 (“Writers, historians, publishers, and their legal advisers can
only guess and pray as to how courts will resolve copyright disputes.”); Jason
Mazzone, Administering Fair Use, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 395, 395 (2009)
(“[T]he fair use law fails to give individuals sufficiently clear guidance to
determine in advance whether their uses of copyrighted works are fair and
therefore noninfringing.”); Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair
Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV. 1483, 1483 (2007) (“[T]he application of the law
has become so unpredictable that would-be fair-users can rarely rely on the
doctrine with any significant level of confidence.”); Gideon Parchomovsky &
Philip J. Weiser, Beyond Fair Use, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 91, 91 (2010) (“[T]he
uncertainty that shrouds fair use and the proliferation of technological
protection measures undermine the doctrine and its role in copyright policy.”).
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promoting the progress of knowledge, argue the critics, because
it results in a chilling of creative activity. Risk-averse users,
apprehensive of copyright bullies and steeped in a “clearance
culture”11 that fosters the preclearance of any use, would rather
not use and re-create at all than do so and risk liability.12
In line with the foregoing criticisms, fair use has been
bestowed with epithets such as “disarray,”13 “in bad shape,”14
“notoriously vague,”15 “nobody knows,”16 “great white whale of
American copyright law,”17 “protean,”18 “difficult—some say
impossible—to define,”19 “confusion,”20 “guess and pray,”21
“mysterious,”22 “disorderly basket of exceptions,”23
“precarious,”24 “nearly impossible to predict,”25 “as vague as
possible,”26 “more fickle than fair,”27 and “astonishingly bad.”28
One well-known commentator has even quipped that “had
Congress legislated a dartboard rather than the particular four
11. Carroll, supra note 10, at 1096.
12. See, e.g., id. (describing how the emerging “clearance culture” may
effectively “nullif[y] the rights that copyright law expressly grants users to use
another’s work without clearance.”); David Fagundes, Crystals in the Public
Domain, 50 B.C. L. REV. 139, 151–53 (2009) (describing “justifiably” risk-
averse users in the face of the “muddy character” of fair use); James Gibson,
Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE
L.J. 882, 887–98 (2007); Mazzone, supra note 10, at 405–12; Parchomovsky &
Goldman, supra note 10, at 1484–1502.
13. Fisher, supra note 8, at 1693.
14. Id. at 1794.
15. Mazzone, supra note 10, at 400.
16. Id.
17. Paul Goldstein, Fair Use in Context, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 433, 433
(2008).
18. Id.
19. Sag, supra note 3, at 1371.
20. Leval, supra note 8, at 1107.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Parchomovsky & Weiser, supra note 10, at 91.
25. Id. at 93.
26. Id.
27. Barry Sookman & Dan Glover, More Fickle than Fair: Why Canada
Should Not Adopt a Fair Use Regime, BARRY SOOKMAN (Nov. 22, 2009),
http://www.barrysookman.com/2009/11/22/more-fickle-than-fair-why-canada-s
hould-not-adopt-a-fair-use-regime/.
28. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 187 (2004).
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fair use factors embodied in the Copyright Act, it appears that
the upshot would be the same” as the current jurisprudence.29
I have serious doubts about such common claims that fair
use is unpredictable and that potential fair users are risk-
averse.30 But I will set aside these doubts for present purposes.
The question I intend to explore instead is whether, assuming
the critics are right in diagnosing that fair use is unpredictable,
29. David Nimmer, “Fairest of Them All” and Other Fairy Tales of Fair
Use, 66 LAW&CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 280 (2003).
30. There has been no systematic empirical demonstration of the
complaint that fair use is vague and unpredictable. To the contrary, recent
empirical scholarship has demonstrated a good deal of consistency in fair use
caselaw, showing that certain factors can predict case outcomes. See Barton
Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005,
156 U. PA. L. REV. 549 (2008); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair
Use, 15 LEWIS& CLARK L. REV. 715 (2011); Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use,
73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47 (2012); Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77
FORDHAM L. REV. 2537 (2009). Indeed, to the extent these empirical studies
are limited to written opinions, they would tend to understate the degree of
predictability. E.g., Beebe, supra, at 577–80, 586. This is because we would
expect easier cases to settle rather than proceed to decision on a dispositive
motion. In easier cases, the parties’ expectations about the legal judgment are
less likely to diverge (i.e., informational asymmetries are reduced), so
settlement is more likely. See generally STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 401–07 (2004); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Litigation
and Settlement Under Imperfect Information, 15 RAND J. ECON. 404, 414
(1984). It might be that the doctrine is predictable for the knowledgeable
scholar but not for the potential fair user in the field who, being risk-averse,
might shy away from legitimate uses for fear of liability. But even the common
claim about risk aversion is questionable. First, to the extent that innovative
activity is often considered risky and even uncertain, one wonders whether
second-generation creators (as opposed to mere users of copyrighted works)
are truly as risk-averse as the fair use critics paint them to be. Second,
behavioral economics, prospect theory in particular, has shown in a variety of
contexts that people are risk-averse (i.e., exhibit decreasing marginal utility)
with respect to gains but risk-loving (i.e., exhibit decreasing marginal
disutility) with respect to losses. See generally JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al., eds., 1982);
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979). So to the extent the uncertainty
surrounding the application of fair use is understood as an uncertainty about
the extent of losses that might accrue as a result of copyright liability, it is not
the kind of uncertainty that would have a significant chilling effect. See
Steven J. Horowitz, Copyright’s Asymmetric Uncertainty, 79 U. CHI. L. REV.
331 (2012) (arguing that copyright law’s asymmetric allocation of
uncertainty—certain for copyrightholders but uncertain for users—is efficient
in light of behavioral economic insights on decision making under uncertainty,
but criticizing the law on other grounds).
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their proposed reforms are the appropriate cure. One strand of
scholarship offers treatments in the nature of reconceptualizing
fair use, arguing what fair use is or should be “really about,”
and advising judges about how best to implement the
doctrine—of this kind are the famous articles by Professor
Gordon and Judge Leval.31 I am not concerned here with these
commentaries. My focus, instead, is on proposed solutions that
would require congressional action.
In order to reduce the purported uncertainty surrounding
fair use, commentators have proposed replacing the current
fair use standard with rules, which would require congressional
action; or creating special-purpose administrative entities,
which would require congressional action and subsequent
bureaucratic action; or a combination of the two. For example,
Michael Carroll has advocated that Congress create a Fair Use
Board.32 This Board would have the power—after receiving a
petition from a to-be user and providing the copyright owner
with notice and an opportunity to challenge the petition—to
declare that a proposed use is fair.33 Such a declaration would
have the force of a private letter ruling from the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) or a no-action letter from the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC).34 That is, it would immunize
the petitioner, but no one else, from copyright infringement.35
The Fair Use Board’s rulings would be subject to
administrative review in the Copyright Office and judicial
review in the Circuit Courts of Appeal.36 Carroll is opposed to
replacing the fair use standard with rules.37
Gideon Parchomovsky and Kevin Goldman, on the other
hand, advocate just such rules in the form of “fair use
harbors.”38 They propose rules declaring that, at a minimum,
certain uses are presumptively legal (other uses would remain
31. Gordon, supra note 8, at 1605 (conceptualizing fair use as a device to
remedy market failures in licensing); Leval, supra note 8, at 1111 (arguing
that in adjudicating fair use cases judges should pay great attention to
whether the complained-of use is transformative). Both articles have been
influential, as documented by Netanel, supra note 30, at 734–35.
32. Carroll, supra note 10, at 1123–43.
33. Id. at 1123, 1125–27.
34. Id. at 1090 & nn.16–17.
35. Id. at 1090, 1123 & nn.16–17.
36. Id. at 1123–28.
37. Id. at 1147–48.
38. Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 10, at 1502–18.
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subject to the four-factor test).39 For example, “for any literary
work consisting of at least one hundred words, the lesser of
fifteen percent or three hundred words may be copied without
the permission of the copyright holder.”40 Similar thresholds
are specified for other kinds of works, including a required
right of access under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.41
These rules would make significant changes to existing law and
would therefore require congressional action.42
David Fagundes has combined some features of the Carroll
and Parchomovsky-Goldman proposals.43 He has endorsed
Parchomovsky and Goldman’s suggestion to establish fair use
noninfringement floors,44 as well as Carroll’s suggestion to
create “infringement boards” to render presumptive fair use
rulings on “easy cases of infringement or noninfringement.”45
The infringement boards could make one of three findings—
“probably infringing, probably not infringing, or no opinion”—
the first two of which would create rebuttable presumptions in
any litigation that might ensue.46
Jason Mazzone likewise has advocated that Congress
create an administrative agency to deal with fair use.47 This
agency would enforce new congressional legislation prohibiting
a copyrightholder’s interference with fair use, issue regulations
that have the force of law, bring enforcement actions against
those who interfere with fair use, adjudicate disputes via
administrative law judges (ALJs), and be subject to limited
judicial review under Chevron deference.48 Alternatively, the
agency could be created in the mold of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), whereby plaintiffs in
copyright infringement actions would be required to go through
the agency before bringing suit in court, and the agency’s
39. Id. at 1510–24.
40. Id. at 1511.
41. Id. at 1512–18, 1521–24.
42. Id. at 1510 (calling for “unilateral action by Congress”).
43. Fagundes, supra note 12, at 175–76, 183–84.
44. Id. at 175–76.
45. Id. at 183–84.
46. Id. at 184.
47. Mazzone, supra note 10, at 395–99, 415–30 (“An administrative
agency can, and should, regulate fair use.”).
48. Id. at 415–18 & n.84.
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findings under its own regulations would be entitled to judicial
deference.49 The agency could be a new entity, or it could be
formed by expanding the present remit of the Copyright
Office.50
In another article, Parchomovsky and Weiser advocate
that Congress establish a new system of “user privileges” that
would require copyright owners to “dramatically increase the
access and use opportunities granted to users.”51 Under this
proposal, Congress would first require that copyright owners
establish measures to facilitate access to digital content and
provide clear notice of these measures for the benefit of users.52
This mandate would be open-ended and leave the details of
how to enhance access to the copyright owners themselves.53
But if copyrightholders fail to establish adequate user
privileges, Congress would move in and, using the experience
gained from the first stage of the mandate, legislate more
specific requirements for user access.54 The Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) would be tasked with enforcing the
regulatory regime.55
All of these (and similar other)56 proposals, with the
exception of Carroll’s, would replace or supplement the
prevailing fair use standard with a regime of rules.57 All of
them, without exception, would require congressional action
(and often executive and administrative action on top of that).58
In other words, they would require a change in the form of laws
from standards to rules, as well as a change in the identity of
the lawmaking institution from the judiciary, which currently
develops fair use doctrine, to Congress and administrative
49. Id. at 419–21.
50. Id. at 427–30.
51. Parchomovsky & Weiser, supra note 10, at 91; see also id. at 95–96.
52. Id. at 96.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 96–97.
55. Id. at 95–97, 126–36 (discussing the role of the FTC in the proposed
regime and its role historically in the privacy policy context).
56. See, e.g., JASON MAZZONE, COPYFRAUD AND OTHER ABUSES OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 185–210 (2011); WILLIAM PATRY, HOW TO FIX
COPYRIGHT 49–74 (2012).
57. See supra text accompanying note 37.
58. Carroll, supra note 10, at 1123; Fagundes, supra note 12, at 183–84;
Mazzone, supra note 10, at 395–96; Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 10,
at 1510; Parchomovsky & Weiser, supra note 10, at 126.
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agencies. Assessing these proposals accordingly demands that
we compare rules with standards and different institutions
with one another.
III. RULES, STANDARDS, AND INSTITUTIONS
The comparison between rules and standards is ubiquitous
in the law.59 By common definition, rules are precise commands
that specify the obligation and the consequences of
noncompliance ex ante; standards articulate the norm more
generally and leave the decision maker more leeway to decide
whether conduct is in compliance ex post.60 For example, the
current regime, under which the fair use decision is made by
reference to the purpose and character of the use, the nature of
59. For general reflections on rules and standards, see Frank Cross et al.,
A Positive Political Theory of Rules and Standards, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1;
Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J.
557 (1992); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law
as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989); Pierre Schlag, Rules and
Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme
Court 1991 Term—Foreword: Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 22 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953
(1995).
60. Kaplow, supra note 59, at 559–60; see also, e.g., MindGames, Inc. v.
West Pub. Co., Inc., 218 F.3d 652, 656–67 (7th Cir. 2000) (“A rule singles out
one or a few facts and makes it or them conclusive of legal liability; a standard
permits consideration of all or at least most facts that are relevant to the
standard’s rationale.”); Cross et al., supra note 59, at 15–18; Schlag, supra
note 59, at 382–83. It might be worth noting a definitional subtlety. Louis
Kaplow points out that in comparing rules and standards commentators often
conflate two distinct dimensions—namely, (1) whether the law is given contact
ex ante or ex post, and (2) how complex the law is. Kaplow, supra note 59, at
586–96. He argues that these dimensions should be kept separate; only the
former is properly defining of ruleness or standardness, and complexity should
be captured by a separate concept. Id. Otherwise, we would risk attributing a
benefit or cost to the law’s ruleness or standardness when that benefit or cost
is properly attributable to the law’s degree of complexity. In Kaplow’s
framework, every standard has its “rule equivalent,” and every rule its
“standard equivalent,” with the same degree of complexity. Id. at 586. So we
could have complex rules, simple rules, complex standards, and simple
standards, not just simple rules and complex standards as commonly
assumed. Id. at 586–96. For further discussion of complexity, see Louis
Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, 11 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 150 (1995). To what extent Kaplow’s distinction is theoretically
defensible, and to what extent it makes a practical difference, are discussions
for another day. I have avoided the conflation that Kaplow has in mind, and
the point is not otherwise material for present purposes.
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the original work, the amount of material taken from the
original work, and the use’s impact on the market for the
original work,61 is a standard. By contrast, a law declaring that
borrowing less than ten percent of a written work constitutes
fair use would be a rule.
These contrasting approaches have tradeoffs. Rules are
costlier to enact but cheaper to enforce; standards are cheaper
to enact but costlier to enforce.62 Rules are clearer and more
predictable, so they facilitate planning.63 On the other hand,
rules are inflexible,64 so they might miss the mark in individual
cases by privileging technical compliance over the substantive
aims of the law. Standards are flexible, keep eyes on the
underlying norm, and allow judgments to be informed by
lessons learned from real controversies, but make the law
harder to predict and planning more difficult.65
These tradeoffs are well-known and do not require more
elaboration. But there is one more point that bears notice: the
choice between rules and standards often amounts to a choice
between different institutions as lawmakers.66 In the United
States, legislation is generally entrusted to the Congress, in
collaboration with the President.67 Courts do, of course, make
law, notwithstanding slogans about “merely applying the law”
and “taking the law as we find it.” But the kind of lawmaking
that courts undertake in the course of deciding cases is usually
context-specific and incremental; it usually does not amount to
general legislation. In light of this division of responsibilities
(or separation of powers), opting for rules or standards usually
means choosing the legislature or the courts, respectively, as
lawmakers.68 Or, to put it more accurately, the courts’ share of
61. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
62. See Kaplow, supra note 59, at 562–63.
63. See Schlag, supra note 59, at 384–85.
64. Id. at 400.
65. See, e.g., id. at 384–85; MindGames, 218 F.3d at 657 (“Standards are
flexible, but vague and open-ended; they make business planning difficult,
invite the sometimes unpredictable exercise of judicial discretion, and are
more costly to adjudicate—and yet when based on lay intuition they may
actually be more intelligible, and thus in a sense clearer and more precise, to
the persons whose behavior they seek to guide than rules would be.”).
66. See Kaplow, supra note 59, at 608–11.
67. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (outlining Congress’ legislative power and the
President’s veto power).
68. See Kaplow, supra note 59, at 568, 608.
2015] NIRVANA FALLACY 285
lawmaking activity vis-à-vis the legislature is smaller for rules
than for standards. Rules require precise specification ex ante
and are thus made by Congress; standards leave room to mold
the law in light of existing controversies and thus give courts a
larger role.69 The current fair use regime, for example, leaves
the bulk of lawmaking to courts. But a rule specifying hard
percentages that can be lawfully taken from a copyrighted
work would have to be promulgated by Congress and, once
promulgated, would be applied in fairly mechanical fashion
with little additional lawmaking by courts.70
It follows that each of the abovementioned proposals to
change fair use would require a change not only in the content
of the law but also in the lawmaking institution. This is true,
as the reform advocates acknowledge, of all the proposals
summarized above (whether or not they advocate rules, which
all but one of them do).71 But the potential significance of this
institutional change is given no serious consideration in the
fair use critics’ proposals. Although some of these articles do
compare and contrast different lawmaking institutions,72 the
comparisons are idealized. They focus only on institutional
competencies, not interests. They discuss what would happen if
Congress were to act just as the scholars would like them to
act, not how Congress would actually act. In particular, these
analyses generally compare the present fair use standard with
69. See id. at 608–11. The foregoing discussion of the allocation of
lawmaking powers between courts and Congress ignores the possible use of
administrative agencies as lawmaking institutions. This simplification does
not pose a problem for present purposes, however, because the point here is
that some fair use critics advocate reforms that would require congressional
action without adequately considering the institutional dynamics prevailing in
Congress. This point is unaffected by the possible role of administrative
agencies. The creation of an agency to administer fair use would obviously
require congressional action.
70. Cf. Kaplow, supra note 59, at 621.
71. See Carroll, supra note 10, at 1123; Fagundes, supra note 12, at 183–
84; Mazzone, supra note 10, at 395–96; Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note
10, at 1510; Parchomovsky & Weiser, supra note 10, at 126.
72. See, e.g., Mazzone, supra note 10, at 430–37 (discussing the benefits of
agency administration); Parchomovsky & Weiser, supra note 10, at 94–97,
106–14, 126–36 (discussing the benefits of congressional regulation that
leaves room for marketplace innovation, as opposed to agency administration
and other proposals).
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an ideal proposed rule, but do not ask how good a rule we
would be likely to get if we were to ask Congress to enact one.
The proposals, in short, fail to contemplate the possibility
that the same real-world constraints that produced the present
problems with the fair use standard might impede the
enactment of an ideal rule. But although considering ideal
rules might be helpful, comparison of present doctrine with an
ideal rule is sterile without some consideration of the ideal’s
chance of realization. Not just sterile, but dangerous: proposals
that do not take account of real-world constraints may well
produce cures that are worse than the disease.
The present critique underlines a problem that Harold
Demsetz dubbed the “nirvana approach.”73 “The view that now
pervades much public policy economics,” he wrote, “implicitly
presents the relevant choice as between an ideal norm and an
existing ‘imperfect’ institutional arrangement. This nirvana
approach differs considerably from a comparative institution
approach in which the relevant choice is between alternative
real institutional arrangements.”74
Public choice theory similarly emphasizes that, because
politicians are self-interested, the political system is subject to
many of the same inefficiencies that characterize the market
system.75 So it would be naïve to assume that the solution to
every market failure is government intervention. James
Buchanan, one of the founders of public choice, summed up the
contribution thus:
[T]he prevailing mind-set of social scientists and philosophers at
midcentury . . . supported by the . . . research program [of]
“theoretical welfare economics,” . . . concentrated on the
identification of the failures of observed markets to meet idealized
standards. In sum, this branch of inquiry offered theories of market
failure. But failure by comparison with what? The implicit
presumption was always that politicized corrections for market
failures would work perfectly. In other words, market failures were
set against an idealized politics. Public choice then came along and
provided analyses of politics, of the behavior of persons in public
73. Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12
J.L. & ECON. 1, 1 (1969).
74. Id.
75. JAMES M. BUCHANAN, CTR. FOR STUDY OF PUB. CHOICE, PUBLIC
CHOICE: THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF A RESEARCH PROGRAM 8 (2003),
available at http://www.gmu.edu/centers/publicchoice/pdf%20links/Booklet
.pdf; see also Charles Wolf, A Theory of Nonmarket Failure: Framework for
Implementation Analysis, 22 J.L. & ECON. 107 (1979).
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choosing roles[,] whether these be voters, politicians, or bureaucrats,
that were on all fours with those applied to markets and to the
behavior of persons as participants in markets. These analyses
necessarily exposed the essentially false comparison that had
described so much of both scientific and public attitudes. In a very
real sense, public choice became a set of theories of governmental
failures, as an offset to the theories of market failures that had
previously emerged from theoretical welfare economics.76
One need not accept all of public choice’s predictions and
analyses, nor share Buchanan’s pro-market orientation, to
appreciate this basic insight about the limitations of ideal-type
analysis. The insight I wish to highlight is not about
substantive public policy; it is methodological. Indeed, Einer
Elhauge deployed the same argument against those legal
scholars who had relied on public choice theory to support more
robust judicial review.77 Those scholars, Elhauge claimed, erred
in contrasting a real-world description of democratic politics
with an idealized description of the judicial process.78 Other
legal scholars have also employed varieties of the same
criticism.79
This criticism reveals a lacuna in the structure of present
fair use “fixes.” Namely, they fail to consider the political
realities and institutional dynamics that would determine the
proposals’ practical chances of realization, as well their
desirability. How big a problem this failure will turn out to be
depends on how different the prevailing political dynamics in
Congress are from what the scholars have imagined them to be.
To learn this we must inquire into the real world of copyright
legislation, a subject that has received substantial scholarly
treatment. The following section turns to this task.
76. BUCHANAN, supra note 75; see alsoWolf, supra note 75.
77. Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive
Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31 (1991).
78. Id. at 34 (“[E]ven if interest group theory succeeds in demonstrating
defects in the political process, that would not justify the leap to the
conclusion that more intrusive judicial review would improve lawmaking. The
litigation process cannot be treated as exogenous to interest group theory
because that process is also subject to forms of interest group influence that
would be exacerbated if judicial review became more intrusive.”).
79. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System?,
80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1743, 1745–46 (2013) (lamenting the “inside/outside fallacy”
whereby a legal scholar employs an external perspective to diagnose the
problems attendant to the system but then switches to an internal perspective
to advocate a public-spirited solution).
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IV. COPYRIGHT IN THE REAL WORLD
[P]ublic domain means nobody really cares because nobody owns it.
— Jack Valenti, President, Motion
Picture Association of America80
In considering the legislative political economy of
copyright, the insights of public choice theory are instructive.
Public choice, as one of its founders was fond of saying, is
“politics without romance.”81 It proceeds on the assumption
that politicians, like everyone else, are motivated primarily by
self-interest, as opposed to a desire to promote the public
good.82 This way of looking at things is of course nothing new; it
was the worldview of Machiavelli, Hobbes, the American
Founders, and countless others.83 Nor is it likely to be found a
shocking revelation—not in this age of dismal Congressional
approval ratings anyway.84 But the public choice theorists’
contributions lay in positing a more precise framing of politics
as a process of supplying and demanding, or selling and buying,
80. Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 483 Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 41 (1995) [hereinafter September 1995
Senate Hearings].
81. BUCHANAN, supra note 75.
82. See id. at 9.
83. Id. at 11–12 (“Public choice did not emerge from some profoundly new
insight, some new discovery, some social science miracle. Public choice, in its
basic insights into the workings of politics, incorporates a presupposition
about human nature that differs little, if at all, from that which informed the
thinking of James Madison at the American founding [and t]he essential
scientific wisdom of the 18th century, of Adam Smith and classical political
economy . . . .”); Gordon Tullock, Public Choice, in THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 723 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume
eds., 2d ed. 2008) (“The only surprising thing about the above propositions
[regarding the self-interestedness of politicians] is that they have not
traditionally been orthodox either in economics or political science. Writers
who did hold them, like Machiavelli in parts of The Prince, were regarded as
morally suspect and tended to be held up as bad examples rather than as
profound analysts.”).
84. See, e.g., Congressional Performance, RASMUSSEN REPS. (Dec. 26,
2014), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/mood_of_am
erica/congressional_performance (finding that “just seven percent (7%) of
Likely U.S. Voters rate Congress’s performance as good or excellent”).
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power and legislation, and in a more rigorous application of the
analytical tools of economics to this framework.85
This analysis has yielded a number of insights, two of
which are particularly pertinent. First, contrary to what one
might assume, larger groups are not systematically more
successful at advocating for their members’ interests and
pushing their agendas.86 The reason for this, as fleshed out
famously by Mancur Olson, is as follows. Groups form to
provide common benefits for their members.87 These benefits
are in the form of “public goods,” meaning they must be
85. For the standard one-volume survey of public choice literature, see
DENNIS MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III (2003). In addition, the following
readings (some of which may not, under a strict definition, fall within the
“public choice” umbrella) provide background: KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL
CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951); DUNCAN BLACK, THE THEORY OF
COMMITTEES AND ELECTIONS (1958); GEOFFREY BRENNAN& LOREN LOMASKY,
DEMOCRACY AND DECISION: THE PURE THEORY OF ELECTORAL PREFERENCE
(1993); JAMES BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT:
LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962); ANTHONY
DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF DEMOCRACY (1957); WILLAM A.
NISKANEN JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971);
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS (1965); WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL
COALITIONS (1962); PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST
INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds.,
2013); Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for
Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371 (1983); Richard A. Posner, Theories of
Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335 (1974); George J.
Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3
(1971). Works more focused on the law include: DANIEL A. FARBER& PHILIP P.
FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991); Daniel
A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX L.
REV. 873 (1987) [hereinafter Farber & Frickey, Jurisprudence of Public
Choice]; Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation through
Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223
(1986); Jerry L. Mashaw, Constitutional Deregulation: Notes Toward a Public,
Public Law, 54 TULANE L. REV. 849 (1980). Many of the important
contributions to the scholarship of public choice and the law are gathered in:
PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW (Daniel A. Farber ed., 2007); PUBLIC CHOICE
AND PUBLIC LAW: READINGS AND COMMENTARY (Maxwell L. Stearns ed.,
1997); Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 167 (1988).
86. What follows is a simplified version of the argument made with more
rigor and detail in OLSON, supra note 85, at 5–36. There might also be other
reasons why small groups perform better—for example being more conducive
to the development of norms—but I will keep to Olson’s classic account.
87. Id.
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provided to all members if they are to be provided at all.88 But
if the benefits will be shared by all members, it is in each
member’s individual interest not to bear the costs of obtaining
these benefits; each would rather sit out, have other members
bear the cost, and enjoy the benefits all the same.89 In large
groups this dynamic tends to prevent any member from acting
in the group’s collective interest, with the result that the
collective good will not be provided at all.90 In small groups, by
contrast, the benefits to an individual member may be so large
as to make it worthwhile to strive to obtain the public good,
even if the member must individually bear all the costs of
obtaining the good.91 So the collective good will be provided in
small, but not in large, groups. In sum, the balance of power
between large and small groups is systematically unlike what
their numbers would suggest.92 All else being equal, small
groups are actually more successful in overcoming collective
action problems.93
Second, and consequently, the likelihood of a given
agenda’s political success depends not only on the magnitude of
its costs and benefits but also on their dispersion.
Concentration is positively correlated with power.94 In the two-
by-two table representing a proposal’s benefits and costs as
being either concentrated or diffuse, a proposal that has
concentrated benefits and diffuse costs is the most likely to
succeed, and a proposal with diffuse benefits and concentrated
costs is the most likely to fail.95 This effect can be so large as to
overwhelm the sheer magnitude of the benefit-cost gap: a
proposal rich in costs and poor in benefits might nevertheless
pass if the meager benefits are concentrated in a few people
and the huge costs are divided among a large number (and vice
versa).96
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE POLITICS OF
REGULATION 366–72 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980).
95. Id.
96. For discussion of the impact of the concentration of costs and benefits,
see, for example, OLSON, supra note 85, at 29, 165–67; Wilson, supra note 94,
at 366–72; Roger G. Noll & Bruce M. Owen, The Political Economy of
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The extent to which these theoretical predictions actually
describe the real world of democratic politics is subject to
debate.97 As applied to copyright, however, they are dead on.
Scholars have documented that Congress often obliges the
wishes of the copyright industry—that is, the few corporations
who own the majority of lucrative copyrighted content—to the
degree that it has delegated the very task of legislation to
them. Jessica Litman’s study of the legislative history of the
1976 Copyright Act shows that the statute time and again
enshrines, often verbatim, the compromises hatched out by
affected interest groups.98 Congress was often just a facilitator:
it cajoled various affected interest groups to sit down together
and hammer out a legislative solution.99 Once a compromise
was reached, Congress simply adopted it without so much as
changing a comma.100 There is no evidence that examining
industry bills for their impact on the public interest, seeing if
they actually “promote the progress of science” as required by
the Constitution,101 entered into Congress’s work.
The situation has only gotten worse in recent years.
William Patry, the former counsel to the House Judiciary
Committee’s Subcommittee on Intellectual Property and
Judicial Administration, describes the scene.
Copyright interest groups hold fund raisers for members of
Congress, write campaign songs, invite members of Congress (and
their staff) to private movie screenings or sold-out concerts, and
Deregulation: An Overview, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEREGULATION:
INTEREST GROUPS IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS 41–43 (Roger G. Noll &
Bruce M. Owen eds., 1983).
97. Compare Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A
Study of the Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s,
139 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 10 (1990) (stating that the usefulness of public choice
theory, among other methods of social scientific prediction, is seriously
limited), with Susannah Camic Tahk, Public Choice Theory & Earmarked
Taxes, 68 TAX L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (employing public choice theory to
argue that how taxes distribute their costs and benefits is associated with the
ability of these taxes to raise revenue over time).
98. Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History,
72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 871–77 (1987).
99. Id. at 867, 870–71 (“Indeed, the Copyright Office and interested
parties hammered out the basic structure of the entire statute before
including Congress in the legislative revision.”).
100. Id. at 860–62, 867, 868 (“Congress enacted the relevant provisions
essentially without change.”).
101. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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draft legislation they expect Congress to pass without any changes.
In the 104th Congress, they are drafting the committee reports and
haggling among themselves about what needs to be in the report. In
my experience, some copyright lawyers and lobbyists actually resent
members of Congress and staff interfering with what they view as
their legislation and their committee report. With the 104th
Congress we have . . . reached a point where . . . not even the hands
of congressional staff have touched committee reports.102
Patry relates that one industry lobbyist was disdainful of
the House Intellectual Property Subcommittee Chairman
because the latter “mistook his role as a member of Congress as
actually involving making policy.”103 The message from the
industry was “we drafted it, the best thing for you to do is to
enact it down to the commas.”104 Sure enough, Congress did
just that.105 This view of copyright legislation is not peculiar to
Litman or Patry; the conclusion that copyright regulators are
“captured” by copyrightholders is shared among many scholars
of intellectual property law.106
Whether such capture is a bad thing depends on the
circumstances. Few would argue that government should not
be responsive to the views of those who are impacted by
governmental policy and who, being in the business, are
knowledgeable about its likely ramifications. But the question
in assessing the desirability of industry-drafted legislation is
102. William F. Patry, Copyright and the Legislative Process: A Personal
Perspective, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 139, 141 (1996); see also Jessica
Litman, War Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337, 350 (2002) (“[O]ur
copyright laws have been written not by Congress, not by Congressional
staffers, not by the copyright office or by any public servant in the executive
branch, but by copyright lobbyists negotiating complex deals among
themselves in complicated multiparty negotiations.”).
103. Patry, supra note 102, at 141–42.
104. Id. at 142.
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION
WITHOUT RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION 133–
38 (2012); see also WILLIAMM. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 25 (2004); Tom W. Bell, Escape
from Copyright: Market Success vs. Statutory Failure in the Protection of
Expressive Works, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 741, 744 (2001); Eli Dourado & Alex
Tabarrok, Public Choice and Bloomington School Perspectives on Intellectual
Property 5 (Mercatus Ctr., Working Paper No. 13–23, 2013); Paul J. Heald,
American Corporate Copyright: A Brilliant, Uncoordinated Plan, 12 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 489, 489 (2005); Mark A. Lemley, The Constitutionalization of
Technology Law, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 529, 532–33 (2000); Glynn S.
Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 898 (2001).
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whether the industry groups who did the drafting represented
the full panoply of the legislation’s benefits and costs. Public
choice theory predicts that ramifications would be fully
considered when both benefits and costs are concentrated, but
that consideration of benefits and costs would be lopsided when
one is concentrated and the other is diffuse, resulting in
legislation that privileges special interests over the public at
large.
These predictions are borne out with remarkable accuracy
in the context of copyright legislation. Where a particular topic
of legislation impacted a narrow set of well-organized interests
on both the benefit and cost sides of the ledger, the resulting
compromise was often balanced (though not necessarily
optimal). The Copyright Act features many such
compromises—including those between copyrightholders and
church groups,107 the restaurant industry,108 the hotel
industry,109 the cable industry,110 satellite television carriers,111
author groups,112 Internet service providers,113 and others.114
The end product in such cases of interest group compromise
could perhaps benefit from more active congressional
involvement, but it was at least defensible because both sides
were well-represented.
On the other hand, where the interests on only one side of
the benefit-cost ledger were concentrated, the resulting law
was predictably one-sided. Such a concentrated-versus-diffuse
interest group structure is most likely to obtain where the
balance to be struck is between rightsholders on one side and
the public domain on the other. Rightsholders are a small
group with well-defined interests. Beneficiaries of the public
domain, on the other hand, are a large and diffuse group—the
general public that benefits from enjoying and building on
literary and artistic works. And their interests, unlike those of
the rightsholders, are not well-defined a priori. In other words,
107. See 17 U.S.C. § 110(3) (2012).
108. See id. at § 110(5).
109. See 17 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) (2012).
110. See id. at § 111(a)(3).
111. See 17 U.S.C. § 119 (2012).
112. See 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2012).
113. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012).
114. See infra Part V.
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the owner of the Mickey Mouse character is sure that he would
benefit immensely from preventing the rodent’s accrual into
the public domain, whereas few members of the general public
are likely to know whether and how much the issue would
impact them. Indeed, the future creator who would add to the
store of American heritage by working off the Mickey Mouse
character may not even be born yet. Public choice theory would
accordingly predict an overall expansion of copyrights and
contraction of the public domain.
This prediction is borne out. There are, as mentioned,
narrowly crafted exceptions to the expansion of copyrights
where it would harm concentrated interests.115 But such
exceptions are the exception. The unmistakable trend of
copyright legislation since the 1976 Act has been one of
copyright expansion and public domain contraction. Thanks to
the efforts of copyright industry lobbyists, the scope of
copyrightable subject matter has greatly expanded;116 the
copyright bundle of rights (“exclusive rights in copyrighted
works”) has multiplied;117 the duration of copyrights has been
lengthened and lengthened;118 the public domain has been
retroactively shrunk to “restore” copyright to public domain
works that had never been copyrighted;119 the unauthorized
recording of concerts and public performances has been
banned;120 criminal penalties for copyright infringement have
increased;121 the 1909 Act’s provision that statutory damages
“shall not be regarded as a penalty”122 has been eliminated;
statutory damage maximums have been increased;123 plaintiffs
have been given the right to elect statutory damages “any time
115. See supra text accompanying notes 107–13.
116. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012); Bell, supra note 106, at 781 (“The subject
matter covered by copyright has steadily expanded, too.”).
117. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
118. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 302–04 (2012).
119. 17 U.S.C. § 104A (2012); Bell, supra note 106, at 782 & nn.198–201
(discussing various retroactive grants of copyright extension and protection).
120. 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (2012).
121. 17 U.S.C. § 506 (2012).
122. 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1970) (repealed); see also Pamela Samuelson &
Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of
Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439 (2009) (providing a thorough discussion
of statutory damages).
123. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2012).
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before final judgment”;124 additional remedies have been made
available to copyright owners;125 the circumvention of
technological measures controlling access to copyrighted works
has been banned,126 doing business in products that could be
used for such circumvention has been prohibited,127 and
criminal penalties have been set down for violations;128
formalities have been eliminated;129 the list goes on and on.130
To be sure, not every single act of copyright expansion was
necessarily detrimental to the public interest. But the overall
effect has been the passage of laws favorable to special
interests even when the aggregate magnitude of the costs far
outweighed the benefits (as well as the non-passage of laws
whose aggregate benefits would have outweighed the costs,
though it is harder to inquire into the non-event).131
124. Id. at § 504(c)(1).
125. E.g., 17 U.S.C. § 503 (2012) (providing for the impoundment or
destruction of infringing copies or phonorecords); 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012)
(permitting awards of costs and attorney fees).
126. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2012).
127. Id. at § 1201(a)–(b).
128. 17 U.S.C. § 1204 (2012).
129. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (providing that “[c]opyright protection
subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression,” and doing away with any requirement to register, affix a © sign,
renew a copyright, or take any other steps to obtain copyright protection); 17
U.S.C. § 408 (2012) (“[R]egistration is not a condition of copyright
protection.”). For a discussion of the role of formalities in early copyright
statutes and their weakening and elimination in the 1976 Act, see Christopher
Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 491–99 (2004).
130. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 106, at 781–86 (detailing the expanding
reach of copyright law in the United States); Dourado & Tabarrok, supra note
106, at 10–12 (discussing changes under the 1976 Copyright Act). In addition
to observing these pro-rightsholder provisions, legislative expansion and
interest group influence have also been gauged by other measures. Looking at
the number of words in the statute, Landes and Posner have found a higher
rate of expansion in copyright legislation than in other areas of federal law,
particularly in the latter part of the Twentieth Century. LANDES & POSNER,
supra note 106, at 2–4. Litman has shown that the prevalence of discrete,
item-specific provisions in the Copyright Act, and records of legislative
history, reflect interest group compromise. See Litman, supra note 98, at 859;
Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L.
REV. 275, 281 (1989); Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright Law for the
Information Age, 75 OR. L. REV. 19, 35–36 (1996).
131. One example of non-passage is that intellectual property protection in
fashion designs is extremely limited. The lack of such a legal regime is
probably attributable less to the fact that fashion protection would be a bad
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Nowhere is the footprint of special interest influence more
visible than in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
of 1998 (CTEA), which extended the duration of copyrights by
twenty years for all existing and future works.132 From a public
interest point of view, the law was utterly nonsensical. The
enormous monopoly deadweight loss imposed by a twenty-year
extension of copyright on all existing and future works was
counterbalanced by virtually zero benefits in the form of
creative incentives. The creation of preexisting works could not
possibly be incentivized because they were, well, preexisting.
Nor was it plausible to think that the twenty-year extension
would incentivize more creative activity in the future.
Calculations by an intellectually diverse group of seventeen
economists (including five Nobel Prize winners) showed that
the present value of the added twenty years to a hypothetical
author would amount to pennies.133 Nor was there any evidence
of public benefits in a form other than creative incentives—for
example, incentives to disseminate, preserve, or otherwise
make available copyrighted works.134 So, in terms of the
idea—Congress implements lots of bad ideas in the copyright realm—than to
the fact that retailers oppose it.
132. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
298, 112 Stat. 2827 (amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304). For most works, this
meant that the copyright term was extended from the life of the author plus
fifty years to the life of the author plus seventy years. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a)
(2012); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 193 (2003).
133. See Brief of George Akerlof et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 5–6, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01–618); see
also Eldred, 537 U.S. at 254–55 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[A] 1% likelihood of
earning $100 annually for 20 years, starting 75 years into the future, is worth
less than seven cents today.”). But see Stan J. Liebowitz & Stephen Margolis,
Seventeen Famous Economists Weigh in on Copyright: The Role of Theory,
Empirics, and Network Effects, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 435, 435–36 (2005)
(criticizing the economists’ brief).
134. Such incentives were part of the reasons offered by the Supreme
Court in Eldred, 537 U.S. at 203, for upholding the CTEA against
constitutional challenges, as well as in Golan v. Holder, for upholding the
retroactive constriction of the public domain. Golan v. Holder 132 S. Ct. 873,
888–89 (2012). But the argument that the CTEA provided incentives to
disseminate or preserve artistic works proceeded on the basis of the circular
logic that any benefit to the copyright industry must perforce amount to a
distributional incentive because the copyright industry is in the distribution
business. Such reasoning contradicts elementary economic theory, which
shows that monopoly results in increased prices and a deadweight loss. See,
e.g., DAVID C. COLANDER, MICROECONOMICS 270–71 (4th ed. 2001)
(elementary undergraduate demonstration of the static deadweight loss of
monopoly); Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and
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benefits and costs that count for purposes of the Copyright
Clause, the CTEA (and certainly the retroactive part of the
CTEA) was all cost and no benefit. And in terms of the
aggregate balance, the CTEA produced a large sum of diffuse
costs and a small sum of concentrated benefits.135
Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224, 228 (1967) (underscoring the dynamic welfare costs
of monopoly). Indeed, the available evidence shows that, as economic theory
would predict, public domain works are more accessible. See Paul J. Heald,
Property Rights and the Efficient Exploitation of the Copyrighted Works: An
Empirical Analysis of Public Domain and Copyrighted Fiction Best Sellers, in
6 NEW DIRECTIONS IN COPYRIGHT LAW 74–76 (Fiona Macmillan ed., 2007);
Christopher Buccafusco & Paul J. Heald, Do Bad Things Happen When Works
Enter the Public Domain: Empirical Tests of Copyright Term Extension, 28
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 5–6 (2013); Paul J. Heald, How Copyright Makes
Books and Music Disappear 2–3 (Ill. Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 13-54,
2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=229
0181; Fiona Murray et al., Of Mice and Academics: Examining the Effect of
Openness on Innovation 3–4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 14819, 2009), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w14819.pdf. The
Court’s reasoning also reduces the Copyright Clause, which has long been held
to embody “both a grant of power and a limitation,” Graham v. John Deere Co.
of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966), to meaninglessness. After all, by the
Court’s logic, any benefit to those in the copyright business would amount to
an incentive to discriminate. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 247. But this is the exact
opposite of what the Copyright Clause’s limitation on the monopoly grant
requires. As Justice Breyer pointed out in dissent, the Copyright Clause
“assumes that it is the disappearance of the monopoly grant, not its
perpetuation, that will, on balance, promote the dissemination of works
already in existence.” Eldred, 537 U.S. at 260 (Breyer, J., dissenting). For a
more extensive discussion of the CTEA and Eldred, see Sepehr Shahshahani,
Toward a Constitutional Copyright Law (unpublished LL.M. thesis in Legal
Theory, New York University School of Law) (on file with author).
135. This is not just the conclusion of CTEA’s challengers and likeminded
folk. Even Justice Ginsburg, who resorted to all manner of logical distortion to
uphold the Act, could not help but hint that it was probably “unwise.” Eldred,
537 U.S. at 208 (“In sum, we find that the CTEA is a rational enactment; we
are not at liberty to second-guess congressional determinations and policy
judgments of this order, however debatable or arguably unwise they may be.”).
And the Register of Copyrights herself acknowledged that the CTEA was a
“big mistake” (although, she hastened to add, “one that Congress can make”).
See Cory Doctorow, Copyright Office Head Denounces “Big Mistake” of
Extending Copyright, BOING BOING (Feb. 21, 2006, 9:02 AM),
http://boingboing.net/2006/02/21/copyright-office-hea.html (quoting Marybeth
Peters, then Register of Copyrights); see also Joe Mullin, Head of US
Copyright Office Wants to Shorten Terms, Just Barely, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 19,
2013, 4:50 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/03/head-of-us-copy
right-office-wants-to-shorten-terms-just-barely/ (reporting on the position of
Maria Pallante, Marybeth Peters’ successor as Register of Copyrights, that
copyright terms should be shortened). Peters’ compunctions, however, did not
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This screwy outcome was the result of a screwy process. In
considering the bills that eventually became the CTEA,
Congress was responsive only to concentrated interests.136 The
impetus for the CTEA came from the Walt Disney Company,
whose Mickey Mouse character was about to fall into the public
domain under the old life-plus-fifty term.137 Congress held
eight days of committee hearings on the CTEA and related
legislation, two of them in Pasadena and Nashville in homage
to the film and music industries.138 Having gone over the
lengthy transcripts of all these hearings, I am struck by the
one-sidedness of the debate among Congressmembers,
executive-branch officials, and testifying witnesses.
prevent her from “wholeheartedly” and “strongly” supporting the copyright
extension bill before the House and the Senate. Copyright Term, Film
Labeling, and Film Preservation Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 989, H.R. 1248
and H.R. 1734 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Prop. of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 232 (1995) [hereinafter June-July 1995
Hearings]; September 1995 Senate Hearings, supra note 80, at 30.
136. See Marvin Ammori, Note, The Uneasy Case for Copyright Extension,
16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287, 295–97 (2002).
137. Id. at 292. In addition to the Mickey Mouse copyright, Disney’s other
divisions then earned billions in revenue from similarly copyrighted
characters like Winnie-the-Pooh. Id.; see also Dourado & Tabarrok, supra note
106, at 12; Chris Sprigman, The Mouse That Ate the Public Domain: Disney,
the Copyright Term Extension Act, and Eldred v. Ashcroft, FINDLAW (Mar. 5,
2002), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20020305_sprigman.html.
138. See Music Licensing Practices of Performing Rights Societies: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop. and Judicial Admin. of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 103rd Cong. (1994) [hereinafter February 1994
Hearings]; June-July 1995 Hearings, supra note 135, at 65 (describing that
the hearings took place in Pasadena); September 1995 Senate Hearings, supra
note 80, at 39, 186; Music Licensing and Small Business: Hearing Before the
H. Comm. on Small Bus., 104th Cong. (1996) [hereinafter May 1996
Hearings]; Pre-1978 Distribution of Recordings Containing Musical
Compositions; Copyright Term Extension; and Copyright Per Program
Licenses: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Prop. of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 1 (1997) [hereinafter June 1997
Hearings] (describing that the hearings took place in Nashville); Musical
Licensing in Restaurants and Retail and Other Establishments: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997) [hereinafter July 1997 Hearings]. Not all of
these hearings involved discussion of the CTEA; the hearings in February
1994, May 1996, and July 1997 discussed only the Fairness in Music Licensing
Act and other legislation that was considered in tandem with copyright
extension. See id.;May 1996 Hearings, supra; February 1994 Hearings, supra.
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Many Congressmembers spoke in favor of copyright term
extension,139 but not a single member stood up to speak against
term extension and in favor of preserving the public domain.
The very concept of the public domain was repeatedly ridiculed
by Congressmembers and witnesses.140 Jack Valenti, the
famous film industry lobbyist and Motion Picture Association of
America (MPAA) president, went so far as saying that the
“public domain means nobody really cares because nobody
owns it.”141 No one challenged him on that—signifying that the
statement, though a flagrant misdescription of the normative
economics, was an accurate representation of the positive
politics. Indeed, Congressmembers joined industry witnesses in
speaking of perpetual copyright.142
The Clinton Administration also supported term extension,
and sent a number of representatives to testify to that effect.143
At one point, an Administration witness testified that the
139. E.g., September 1995 Senate Hearings, supra note 80 (statements of
Senators Orrin Hatch and Diane Feinstein); June-July 1995 Hearings, supra
note 135, at 1 (statement of Rep. Carlos Moorhead).
140. A prominent attack involved holding up a copy of a Beethoven CD or
Tolstoy book and comparing their prices to a Pearl Jam CD or John Grisham
book, and using the fact that they have similar prices as proof that the public
domain does not benefit consumers. See, e.g., June-July 1995 Hearings, supra
note 135, at 86, 235. This obvious fallacy seems to have been accepted by
Congressmembers as “evidence” of the public domain’s uselessness. E.g., id. at
224 (statement of Rep. Patricia Schroeder).
141. September 1995 Senate Hearings, supra note 80, at 41.
142. See 144 CONG. REC. H9952 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of Rep.
Mary Bono) (“Actually, Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright protection
to last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change would violate the
Constitution . . . . As you know, there is also Jack Valenti’s proposal for term
to last forever less one day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next
Congress.”); June-July 1995 Hearings, supra note 135, at 230 (statement of
Rep. Martin Hoke) (“We’re talking about some works that will have lasting
impact. I mean, maybe the works of Gershwin may be considered to be like the
works of Mozart in 200 years. Why 70 years? Why not forever? Why not 150
years?”); id. at 234 (statement of Quincy Jones) (“And I’m particularly
fascinated with Representative Hoke’s statement. I found a whole new view of
things there. He just mentioned, why not forever? I never thought of that
before. That’s a good one.”).
143. See June-July 1995 Hearings, supra note 135, at 207–11 (testimony of
Charlene Barshefsky, Deputy U.S. Trade Rep.); id. at 212–20 (testimony of
Bruce Lehman, Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of
Patents and Trademarks); September 1995 Senate Hearings, supra note 80, at
23–24 (testimony of Bruce Lehman, Assistant Secretary of Commerce and
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks).
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President’s views on term extension were so similar to
Congress’s that “if Government works were copyrighted, the
administration’s opening statement might be an infringement
of the chairman’s opening statement.”144
The witnesses Congress called to testify were also
overwhelmingly pro-extension. In the June-July 1995 House
hearings, eleven witnesses testified in favor of term extension
and only two witnesses testified against.145 Likewise, in the
September 1995 Senate hearings, five witnesses testified in
favor of term extension and only one witness testified
against.146 And for the June 1997 hearings, the House called
six witnesses testifying in favor of copyright extension and did
not call any opposing witnesses.147
The few contrarian witnesses were not industry
representatives with financial clout but university
professors.148 The witnesses on the other side, by contrast, were
mostly industry representatives, lobbyists, and famous
entertainers, and they were treated with frequent softball
questions and buddy boy sentiments from Congressmembers.149
144. June-July 1995 Hearings, supra note 135, at 212 (testimony of Bruce
Lehman).
145. The two witnesses testifying against were John Belton, a professor of
English and film at Rutgers University, and Dennis Karjala, a professor of law
at Arizona State University. See id. at 312, 355. There were two additional
witnesses—William Patry and Jerome Reichman, both law professors—whom
I did not count as either for or against extension. See id. These witnesses were
not opposed to copyright extension per se but had some reservations about how
it would be achieved under the CTEA. See id. Namely, both Patry and
Reichman wanted the additional twenty years to go to the creator rather than
the copyrightholder, and Reichman also opposed expanding the copyright term
for works for hire. Id. at 312, 355.
146. The lone witness testifying against extension was Peter Jaszi, a
professor of law at American University. See September 1995 Senate Hearings,
supra note 80, at 71 (statement of Peter Jaszi).
147. I did not count the testimony of Julius Epstein, a screenwriter, and
Jerome Reichman, a professor of law, as being either for or against extension.
Both supported extension in principle but wanted the additional twenty years
to go to authors rather than current copyrightholders, and Reichman also
opposed extension for works for hire. See, e.g., June 1997 Hearings, supra note
138, at 28, 48 (statements of Julius Epstein, Screenwriter and Member,
Writers Guild of America, West, on Behalf of the Writers Guild of America,
and Jerome Reichman, Professor Vanderbilt School of Law); see also June-July
1995 Hearings, supra note 135, at 77 n.19.
148. Ammori, supra note 136, at 293.
149. For example, Orrin Hatch, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, was full of love for famous lobbyist Jack Valenti:
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(And these were the public deliberations.) There was no similar
love fest for the professors testifying against. The one-sided
nature of congressional hearings on the CTEA was well
summed up by Representative Delahunt’s statement that
“there is near unanimity, with the exception—and I think
[Representative Sensenbrenner] is expressing some
reservations—of Professor Reichman, about the sensible and
cogent argument that we ought to extend copyright.”150
This one-sided process stands in sharp contrast with the
debate surrounding the Fairness in Music Licensing Act
(FMLA), which expanded the exemption from the performance-
I have to say I have been fascinated myself. I am worried about when
these new rules kick in whether we can still see some of those first-
line movies down there at MPAA. So we will have to work that out.
And the big reason that I like to do it is, frankly, just to be able to say
hello to you on a regular basis, because you are an institution in this
town; and whether people agree or disagree with you, I think most
everybody has tremendous respect for you. And they should.
September 1995 Senate Hearings, supra note 80, at 42. And Representative
John Conyers tried to best all other Representatives in praising Quincy Jones:
Could I, Mr. Chairman, could I add my welcome to Mr. Jones, our
witness? . . . As one who may have known him as long as anybody in
the Congress—we don’t like to get into the numbers thing, but it’s a
real pleasure to have him come here. It was at some expense of his
time to travel across the country, and it makes me feel very good
because I’ve seen him in every part of our society except as a witness
in Congress. [Laughter.] I don’t know if you’ve been doing this a long
time or not, but, Quincy, you are probably one of the last survivors of
that part of the jazz era called ‘bop,’ and reviewing this in one of the
documents about you, it made me remember that you tie—through
you have come all the contacts with almost all the musicians—black,
white, Latin, international, local, foreign, domestic, and everything
else. And whenever I used to hear a good tune that I didn’t know who
did it, after about three or four times of finding out that it was you, I
probably attributed tunes to you that maybe you didn’t do, but it
always fascinated me, that great variety in your repertoire that you
could reach to it. So I’m very, very happy to have you here.
June-July 1995 Hearings, supra note 135, at 233; see also id. (statement of
Rep. George Gekas) (bantering about with Quincy Jones); September 1995
Senate Hearings, supra note 80, at 95 (statement of Senator Fred Thompson)
(praising his “good friend, Patrick Alger”).
150. June 1997 Hearings, supra note 138, at 86.
302 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 16:1
license requirement enjoyed by bars and restaurants.151 Unlike
the copyright extension bill, which pitted the concentrated
interests of the copyright industry against the diffuse interests
of public users, the music licensing bill pitted concentrated
copyright owners against the concentrated hospitality industry,
which was campaigning for a discrete benefit. The results
panned out just as public choice theory would predict. With this
bill, unlike the CTEA, there was a rough parity in the number
of witnesses for and against.152 Congressmembers spoke
passionately against as well as in favor of the bill,153 and the
Clinton Administration came out in opposition.154 When there
are concentrated interest groups on both sides of an issue, the
battle does indeed heat up.
The same structure obtained when the issues of term
extension and restaurant exemption came before the whole
Congress. In both the House and the Senate, there was raging
debate on the Fairness in Music Licensing bill, with proponents
and opponents making impassioned statements155 and calling
151. Fairness in Music Licensing Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112
Stat. 2830–34 (codified as amended 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 110, 504, and 17 U.S.C §
512 (2012)).
152. In the May 1996 hearings, there were three witnesses in favor of
expanding the restaurant exemption and two witnesses against (and one
witness who did not come out one way or the other); and in the July 1997
hearings there were four witnesses in favor and six witnesses against. See
generally July 1997 Hearings, supra note 138; May 1996 Hearings, supra note
138.
153. Compare, e.g., July 1997 Hearings, supra note 138, at 3–5 (statement
of Rep. Jim Sensenbrenner) (urging the expansion of the restaurant
exemption and denouncing the performing rights organizations as the
“coercive apparatus of a monopoly navigating with their platoons of
lawyers . . . .”), with id. at 63 (statement of Rep. Barney Frank) (ridiculing the
supporters of expanding the restaurant exemption). Representative Bono went
so far as to call Representative Sensenbrenner a “hypocrite.” Id. at 7.
154. See, e.g., July 1997 Hearings, supra note 138, at 16 (testimony of
Robert Stoll, Administrator of the Office of Legislative and International
Affairs, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office).
155. As always, both sides said they were in favor of “small business.”
Compare 144 CONG. REC. H1457–58 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 1998) (statement of
Rep. Scarborough) (speaking against the FMLA and claiming that it would
apply to “struggling” artists who are not “rich and famous rock star types” and
would “just gut their ability to earn a living”), with 144 CONG. REC. H1459
(daily ed. Mar. 25, 1998) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (speaking in favor
of the FMLA: “It sends the message that the voice of the tavern keeper in
Boston, Massachusetts, Greensboro, North Carolina, or Milwaukee, Wisconsin
is just as important as the parade of celebrities that Hollywood has trotted
out . . . .”). Scarborough then rose again to say that it was he, not
2015] NIRVANA FALLACY 303
each other names.156 But no such controversy erupted about
term extension—everyone was in favor.157 There were plenty of
Congressmembers who spoke for the concentrated copyright
and hospitality industries, but not a single representative of
the public defended the public domain against encroachment by
term extension. The Congressmembers who opposed term
extension did so not out of concern for contraction of the public
domain, but by way of holding term extension hostage to the
restaurant exemption; they withdrew their opposition once the
latter was expanded.158 Diffuse interests simply did not count.
In the end, the CTEA easily cleared committee and became
law. It was favorably reported out of the House Judiciary
Committee by voice vote159 and out of the Senate Judiciary
Committee by a roll call vote of fifteen yeas to three nays.160
Before the whole Congress, support was so overwhelming that
the bill passed by unanimous consent in the Senate161 and by
voice vote in the House.162 The only reason the CTEA took until
1998 to become law was that its passage was tied by
Representative Sensenbrenner to the Fairness in Music
Licensing bill.163 It was the latter, not the former, that became
a close call and engendered delay.164 The Fairness in Music
Sensenbrenner, who was pro-small business, and the song and dance
continued. See 144 CONG. REC. H1460 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 1998).
156. Compare 144 CONG. REC. H1457 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 1998) (statement
of Rep. Doggett) (speaking against the FMLA and calling it “the Music Theft
Act”), with 144 CONG. REC. H1472–73 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 1998) (statement of
Rep. Talent) (speaking in favor of the FMLA).
157. E.g., 144 CONG. REC. H9949 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of Rep.
Jackson-Lee); 144 CONG. REC. H9950 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of
Rep. Coble); 144 CONG. REC. S11,672 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of
Sen. Leahy); 144 CONG. REC. S11,673 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of
Sen. Thurmond).
158. E.g., 144 CONG. REC. H1459 (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (“I
rise in support of H.R. 2589, the Copyright Term Extension Act, if, and only if,
my amendment to ensure fairness in music licensing passes.”).
159. H.R. REP. NO. 105-452, at 6 (1998).
160. S. REP. NO. 104-315, at 21 (1996).
161. 144 CONG. REC. S11,673.
162. 144 CONG. REC. H9954 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998).
163. See 144 CONG. REC. H1457–59 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 1998) (statement of
Rep. Sensenbrenner).
164. The restaurant exemption occupied Congress for a number of years.
Congress first tried to persuade restaurateurs and the performance rights
organizations to reach a compromise. When that failed, it considered
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Licensing bill was ultimately added as Title II of the Copyright
Term Extension Act, which ensured its passage.165
In short, the legislative political economy of copyright is
such that the rightsholders get their way and the general
public is unheard, resulting in a relentless expansion of
copyrights. Recognizing this reality renders the proposals to
“fix” fair use by congressional legislation decidedly unrealistic.
There is no reason to suppose that a Congress so enthralled by
the copyright industry would have any interest in passing laws,
be it to create new fair use rules or a new administrative
agency, that would decrease the power of copyright owners vis-
à-vis users. Quite the contrary, the foregoing review of
legislative dynamics indicates that the most likely result of a
shift in lawmaking responsibility to Congress would be a
smaller fair use safe harbor. This would be a perverse result for
reform advocates, as their goal is to expand access and make
life easier for users and second-generation creators.166 The
reformers’ efforts, it would seem, are self-defeating.
Remarkably, however, they devote little attention to the
immense political barriers standing in the way of their
legislative proposals.
To his credit, Carroll does devote a page and a half to
exploring the political barriers to his proposal for a Fair Use
Board.167 His analysis of this point, however, is too breezy. He
does not explore the public choice problems that would attend
the creation and makeup of the Fair Use Board or the
likelihood of regulatory capture in the Board’s subsequent
performance. And his assurance that the “proposal is not a
legislative solutions. Term extension would have passed much earlier had it
not been tied to the restaurant exemption. When there finally came time for
floor debate, the House first voted on the McCollum Amendment, a less
generous expansion of the restaurant exemption offered in place of the
Sensenbrenner Amendment, and the amendment was defeated by a vote of
150 ayes, 259 noes, and 22 not voting. 144 CONG. REC. H1481–83 (daily ed.
Mar. 25, 1998). Then the House voted on the Sensenbrenner Amendment, and
passed it by a vote of 297 ayes, 112 noes, and 22 not voting. Id. Once the
music-licensing issue was taken care of, the extension legislation was passed
swiftly by both chambers of Congress. See Sonny Bono Copyright Term
Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (amending
scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
165. See Pub. L. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827–34.
166. See supra Part II.
167. See Carroll, supra note 10, at 1142–43.
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threat to the interests of copyright owners”168 is not credible.
The very purpose of the proposal, as Carroll explains in the
beginning, is to reduce the power of rightsholders to scare users
and second-generation creators into obtaining a license for
every use instead of relying on fair use.169 Such a proposal is by
necessity “a threat to the interests of copyright owners”;
indeed, that is the whole point of it. These difficulties are too
serious to be alleviated by the comment that the proposal
might be “ahead of its time.”170
Other legislative proposals are even more oblivious to the
real world than Carroll’s. Mazzone refers in passing to the
possibility of bureaucratic capture when discussing his
proposal for administrating fair use by an agency, but he fails
to answer the question of why our pro-copyrightholder
Congress would have any interest in creating or empowering
an administrative agency to undercut the power of
copyrightholders.171 The other commentators make no effort at
all to reconcile their image of ideal laws with the realities of
copyright legislation.172 Their legislative proposals are divorced
from reality and, as such, destined to fail.
V. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS AND QUALIFICATIONS
This conclusion about the futility of reform efforts
predicated on congressional action would be false, however, if
at least one of the following conditions is satisfied: (1) if the
interest group structure is such that fair use falls into the
exceptional pockets of resistance to copyright expansion, or (2)
if recent developments in the technology world have
fundamentally upended the old power structure, as evidenced
by the 2012 defeat of SOPA and PIPA in Congress.173
Unfortunately for reform advocates, neither of these conditions
is satisfied.
168. Id. at 1142.
169. Id. at 1089–96.
170. Id. at 1091, 1143.
171. SeeMazzone, supra note 10, at 429–30.
172. See supra Part II.
173. See Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft
of Intellectual Property Act, S. 968, 112th Cong. (2011); Stop Online Piracy
Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011).
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A. INTERESTGROUP STRUCTURE
With respect to interest group structure, fair use is more
like the CTEA than the FMLA. There are no concentrated
interests to counter the rightsholders’ influence. If anything,
fair use is the paradigm case of a concentrated-versus-diffuse
structure. Whereas most other expansion-curbing provisions of
the Copyright Act reflect specific compromises between the
concentrated copyright industry and the concentrated interests
that resisted expansion in some particular area,174 § 107 is a
catchall protection for all users. Fair use, unlike other
legislative exceptions to ever-expanding copyright, does not pit
concentrated interests against concentrated interests; rather, it
pits the concentrated copyright industry that would benefit
from user restrictions against the diffuse, and often unknown,
members of the public who would benefit from more user
rights.175 This interest group structure means that any
redrafting would likely go in the wrong direction.
It is true that concentrated interests sometimes stand
behind fair use. When the 1976 Copyright Act was being drawn
up, libraries and educational institutions argued for a stronger
§ 107.176 And the Google Books controversy has seen the
behemoth Google line up on the side of fair use.177 But that
does not make for a well-balanced interest group structure.
Universities and libraries are not in the same weight class as
the copyright industry, and their efforts will likely be limited to
educational and scholarly uses anyway. They cannot be relied
on as protectors of second-generation creators. Nor have they
had much to say about file sharing, streaming, user-generated
174. See supra text accompanying notes 107–13.
175. See Litman, supra note 98, at 886 (“In the midst of these expansively
defined rights and rigid exemptions, the fair use doctrine became the statute’s
central source of flexibility. In the earliest versions of the bill, the beleaguered
fair use provision offered the sole means of tempering the expansive scope of
the copyright owner’s exclusive rights. Fair use was also the sole safe harbor
for interests that lacked the bargaining power to negotiate a specific
exemption.”).
176. See id. at 869, 887; see also WILLIAM PATRY, PATRY ON FAIR USE §§
9:1–9:37 (2014) (recounting the legislative history of § 107).
177. See Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y.
2013).
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content, and the multitude of similar issues that the Internet
has brought to the fore.178
Google and its ilk are more powerful, but they will
probably find it advantageous to concentrate on fine-tuned
exceptions—just as they did with respect to the safe harbor
provision of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act179 and just
as other concentrated interests have done—rather than on a
catchall guardian of the public domain.180 It is quite possible,
for example, that we will witness the emergence of a sui generis
regime to deal with issues such as Google Books. Indeed,
Google initially settled with the plaintiffs, but the settlement
was thrown out by the district judge.181 It seems that a decision
on fair use grounds was not Google’s first choice but was
instead forced by the Second Circuit, which instructed the
district court to adjudicate the fair use defense before deciding
the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification.182 In short, Google’s
guardianship of fair use is an ephemeral coincidence. There are
no concentrated interests reliably standing behind fair use,
which ensures its unpopularity in Congress.
This reality is reflected in the fate of fair use legislation.
One might think that the very existence of a fair use provision
in the Copyright Act is testimony to Congress’s receptivity to
the idea of protecting the public domain from copyright
expansion. Such a conclusion, however, would be vastly
overstated. To begin, we must remember that it was not
Congress that created fair use. Fair use existed long before the
1976 Copyright Act and its § 107.183 It appeared famously in
178. In the file sharing context, this might be in part due to the fact that “a
college or university has no legal obligation to defend or accept responsibility
for the illegal actions [including copyright violations] of its students, faculty,
or staff.” Constance S. Hawke, Piracy and Protocols: Handling Information on
University Networks, 209 EDUC. L. REP. 17, 25 (2006); see also Rebecca
Lindsey, Obama Administration Defends $650K File Sharing Fine Against
Grad Student, DAILY TECH (Jan. 21, 2010, 2:16 PM), http://www.dailytech.com
/Obama+Administration+Defends+650K+File+Sharing+Fine+Against+Grad+
Student/article17478.htm.
179. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012).
180. See supra notes 107–13 for a recounting of specific areas of interest
group-inspired resistance against copyright expansion.
181. See Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 686
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
182. See Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 721 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2013).
183. See supra note 3.
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Justice Story’s 1841 opinion in Folsom v. Marsh,184 and less
famously in English cases of even earlier times.185 And it was
continuously refined by judges, without the aid of any statutory
guidance, in the 135 years from Folsom to the 1976 Copyright
Act. Fair use is a creation of judges, not congressmen.
Nor did § 107 expand fair use. The House and Senate
Reports both state clearly that “Section 107 is intended to
restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change,
narrow, or enlarge it in any way.”186 Although such a statement
does not constitute a definitive interpretation of § 107—it is
subject to all the usual criticisms about the use of legislative
history in interpreting statutes, plus it leaves one wondering
what the point of legislation is if it does not change the law—its
basic truth cannot be denied. There is nothing in § 107 that
was not already in the long-developed body of common law
jurisprudence on fair use.187 The more ambitious exemptions
from copyright infringement lobbied for by libraries and
educational groups—most notably, a general exemption for
educational and research uses made by not-for-profit entities,
but also a private use exemption and an exemption for certain
computer uses—never made it into the Copyright Act.188 So the
184. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
185. See generally Sag, supra note 3 (reviewing English “fair abridgement”
cases litigated between 1710 and 1841).
186. See S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 62 (1975); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66
(1976).
187. Indeed, the four factors prefigure in Folsom itself. See Folsom, 9 F.
Cas. at 348–49 (“In short, we must often, in deciding questions of this sort,
look to the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of
the materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or
diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work. Many
mixed ingredients enter into the discussion of such questions. In some cases, a
considerable portion of the materials of the original work may be fused, if I
may use such an expression, into another work, so as to be undistinguishable
in the mass of the latter, which has other professed and obvious objects, and
cannot fairly be treated as a piracy; or they may be inserted as a sort of
distinct and mosaic work, into the general texture of the second work, and
constitute the peculiar excellence thereof, and then it may be a clear
piracy . . . . The intention to pirate is not necessary in an action of this
sort . . . . Much must, in such cases, depend upon the nature of the new work,
the value and extent of the copies, and the degree in which the original
authors may be injured thereby.”).
188. Libraries and educational groups did, however, get a little bit of what
they wanted by obtaining a limited right to copy for libraries and archives in §
108 and remission of statutory damages for nonprofit employees acting upon a
reasonable and bona fide belief that their copying constituted fair use in §
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enactment of a fair use provision as part of the 1976 Copyright
Act does not represent a triumph for user groups against
copyrightholders (though it probably does not represent a
victory the other way around either).189
Any illusions about the 1976 Congress’s support of the
public domain are dispelled when one considers that the 1976
Act was extremely pro-rightsholder as a whole. Among other
things, the Act lengthened the term of copyright from twenty-
eight years renewable for an additional twenty-eight years (for
a maximum total of fifty-six years) to life of the author plus
fifty years,190 disposed of certain “formalities” that had
previously been required for copyright protection,191 conferred
on copyrightholders a general right to “prepare derivative
works based upon the copyrighted work,”192 eliminated the “for
profit” requirement for a public performance to constitute
infringement,193 increased the maximum statutory damages
award,194 gave plaintiffs the right to elect statutory damages at
any time during litigation,195 and eliminated the 1909 Act’s
proviso that statutory damages “shall not be regarded as a
504(c)(2) (2012). For a detailed recounting of the legislative history of fair use,
including extended discussion of the failed educational exemption, see PATRY,
supra note 176, at §§ 9:1–9:37; see also Litman, supra note 98, at 875–77, 887–
88.
189. It is possible that the codification of fair use had the intention or effect
of curtailing the defense. Passing diluted reform legislation to forestall real
reform, be it legislative or judicial, is not unheard of. But I found no evidence
that § 107 was primarily intended to limit fair use or that it had such an
effect.
190. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2012). As discussed, the CTEA further extended the
term of protection to life of the author plus seventy years. See Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 §§ 302, 304; supra text accompanying
note 132.
191. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
192. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2012); see also 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103 (2012).
Copyright protection for derivative works existed prior to the 1976 Act, but the
piecemeal protection was made general for the first time in the Act. See, e.g.,
Pamela Samuelson, The Quest for a Sound Conception of Copyright’s
Derivative Work Right, 101 GEO. L.J. 1505, 1509, 1511–17 (2013).
193. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4). For an explanation of the elimination of the so-
called “nonprofit exemption,” see H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 62–63 (1976) and
S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 59 (1975).
194. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2012).
195. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1).
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penalty.”196 Surely it cannot be said of a Congress that ushered
in such sweeping swelling of copyrights that it intended to
create a great public safe haven by codifying fair use. The 1976
Congress unmistakably sided with rightsholders and against
the public domain, even if this side taking is not as evident in §
107 as in other sections of the Copyright Act.
In any event, any ambivalence one might feel when
characterizing Congress’s attitude toward fair use in 1976
disappears when assessing that body’s posture today. If
Congress was lukewarm about user rights in 1976, it is
decidedly hostile now. That hostility is reflected in the fate of
three major fair use bills that have been introduced in recent
years.
The Digital Media Consumers’ Rights Act, introduced by
Representative Rick Boucher in October 2002 and again in
January 2003 and March 2005, would have amended the
anticircumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA) by providing that circumvention of
access-controlling technological measures is permitted if it does
not result in copyright infringement, and that manufacturing
or selling circumventing devices is permitted if carried out
solely for purposes of scientific research on technical protection
measures.197 The bill would have also fully restored the rule of
Sony v. Universal City Studios by exempting from contributory
infringement the distribution of hardware or software “capable
of enabling significant noninfringing use.”198
196. Copyright Act of 1909 § 25(b), 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1970) (repealed). For
a discussion of statutory damages under the 1909 and 1976 Copyright Acts,
see Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 122, at 446–63.
197. Digital Media Consumers’ Rights Act of 2002, H.R. 5544, 107th Cong
(2002); Digital Media Consumers’ Rights Act of 2003, H.R. 107, 108th Cong.
(2003); Digital Media Consumers’ Rights Act of 2005, H.R. 1201, 109th Cong. §
5 (2005).
198. H.R. 5544 § 5(b)(2). Compare Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984) (“[T]he sale of copying equipment, like
the sale of other articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory
infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable
purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capable of substantial noninfringing
uses.”), with MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 918 (2005)
(“We hold that one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its
use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative
steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of
infringement by third parties.”). The bill also contains measures related to the
proper labeling of copy-protected CDs. See H.R. 1201 §§ 3–4.
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Similarly, the Benefit Authors Without Limiting
Advancement or Net Consumer Expectations (BALANCE) Act,
introduced by Representative Zoe Lofgren in March 2003 and
again in December 2005, would have exempted archival and
personal uses of lawfully acquired digital works from liability
for copyright infringement.199 It would have also affirmed that
the first sale doctrine applies to sales of digital works.200 And it
would have amended the DMCA’s anticircumvention provisions
by providing that circumvention of access-controlling
technological devices is not prohibited if such circumvention is
necessary to enable a noninfringing use of a work.201
Finally, the Freedom and Innovation Revitalizing U.S.
Entrepreneurship (FAIR USE) Act, introduced in February
2007 by Representative Rick Boucher, would have made the
DMCA’s prohibition on the circumvention of access-controlling
technological devices inapplicable to acts of circumvention
carried out solely for the following purposes: (1) to make
compilations of audiovisual works for educational use in a
classroom by an instructor;202 (2) to skip over “commercial or
personally objectionable content” in an audiovisual work;203 (3)
to transmit a work over a home or personal network (excluding
Internet uploads for mass redistribution);204 (4) to gain access
to public domain works included in a compilation consisting
primarily of such works;205 (5) to access a work of “substantial
public interest” for purposes of “criticism, comment, news
reporting, scholarship, or research;”206 and (6) for public or
research libraries, to “preserve or secure a copy or to replace a
copy that is damaged, deteriorating, lost, or stolen.”207 The
199. Benefit Authors Without Limiting Advancement or Net Consumer
Expectations (BALANCE) Act of 2005, H.R. 4536, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005);
Benefit Authors Without Limiting Advancement or Net Consumer
Expectations (BALANCE) Act of 2003, H.R. 1066, 108th Cong. § 3 (2003).
200. H.R. 4536 § 4; H.R. 1066 § 4.
201. H.R. 4536 § 5; H.R. 1066 § 5.
202. Freedom and Innovation Revitalizing U.S. Entrepreneurship Act of
2007, H.R. 1201, 110th Cong. § 3(b) (2007) (proposing to add provision (G)(i) to
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)).
203. Id. (proposing to add provision (G)(ii) to § 1201(a)(1)).
204. Id. (proposing to add provision (G)(iii) to § 1201(a)(1)).
205. Id. (proposing to add provision (G)(iv) to § 1201(a)(1)).
206. Id. (proposing to add provision (G)(v) to § 1201(a)(1)).
207. Id. (proposing to add provision (G)(vi) to § 1201(a)(1)).
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FAIR USE Act would have further exempted the distribution of
hardware “capable of substantial, commercially significant
noninfringing use” from contributory copyright infringement.208
As the foregoing summaries make clear, all of these bills
would have strengthened the legal position of users vis-à-vis
copyrightholders. So it is no surprise that they were supported
by user groups and opposed by copyright industry
organizations.209 Nor is it a surprise, given the previously
described interest group structure, that none of the bills ever
got anywhere. The same fate befell other pro-public domain
bills recently introduced in Congress.210 In short, the recent
history of fair use legislation shows that Congress is in no way
inclined to support legislation that would strengthen fair use or
208. Id. § 2(b). The bill also seeks to reform the statutory damages
provisions of the Copyright Act. See id. § 2(a).
209. For contemporary expressions of support and opposition, see, for
example, Boucher, Doolittle Float “FAIR USE” Act, ANALOGHOLE (Feb. 28,
2007), http://analoghole.typepad.com/analoghole/2007/02/boucher_doolitt.html;
Thomas Claburn, FAIR USE Act Aims to Clarify Copyright Limits,
INFORMATIONWEEK (Feb. 28, 2007, 5:06 PM), http://www.informationweek
.com/fair-use-act-aims-to-clarify-copyright-limits/d/d-id/1052437; ALERT: Tell
Congress to Support Rep. Boucher & Doolittle’s Digital Media Consumers’
Rights Act!, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 10, 2002),
https://www.eff.org/effector/15/32; Grant Gross, Bill Would ‘Protect’ Consumers
from DMCA, INFOWORLD (Mar. 5, 2003), http://www.infoworld.com/t
/applications/bill-would-protect-consumers-dmca-950; Grant Gross, RIAA
Opposes New Fair Use Bill, INFOWORLD (Feb. 28, 2007),
http://www.infoworld.com/d/security-central/riaa-opposes-new-fair-use-bill-7
49; Rik Lambers, A Short Analysis of the May 2004 Hearing on the Digital
Media Consumers’ Rights Act, INDICARE (Jan. 20, 2005),
http://www.indicare.org/tiki-read_article.php?articleId=70; Jacob Roberts,
Library Copyright Alliance Strongly Supports H.R. 1201, the FAIR USE Act,
DISTRICT DISPATCH (Feb. 28, 2007), http://www.districtdispatch.org
/2007/02/library-copyright-alliance-strongly-supports-hr-1201-the-fair-use-act/.
Note, however, that some pro-public domain groups refused to support the
FAIR USE Act because they thought it did not go far enough in curbing the
DMCA’s abuses. See, e.g., Julie Jacobson, Fair Use Act Would Allow In-Home
Content Sharing, Not DVD Ripping, CEPRO (Mar. 3, 2007),
http://www.cepro.com/article/fair_use_act_would_allow_in_home_content_shar
ing_not_dvd_ripping/; Tim Lee, FAIR USE Act Analysis: DMCA Reform Left
on the Cutting Room Floor, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 28, 2007, 10:12 AM),
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2007/02/8942/.
210. See, e.g., Section 115 Reform Act of 2006, H.R. 5553, 109th Cong.
(2006); Public Domain Enhancement Act of 2005, H.R. 2408, 109th Cong.
(2005); Public Domain Enhancement Act of 2003, H.R. 2601, 108th Cong.
(2003); Digital Choice and Freedom Act of 2002, H.R. 5522, 107th Cong.
(2002).
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otherwise improve the position of users and second-generation
creators vis-à-vis content owners.
B. SOPA AND PIPA
Finally, what about the recent defeat of SOPA and PIPA
by a much-heralded grassroots campaign? SOPA and PIPA
were bills introduced in the House and the Senate, respectively,
in 2011.211 They were purportedly designed to combat massive
copyright infringement by “rogue” foreign websites.212 The bills
would authorize actions by private parties and the Attorney
General to require payment processors and advertisers to
refrain from doing business with infringing websites.213 They
would even compel search engines and Internet service
providers to delink and delist infringing websites—which
means wiping the Internet clean of undesirable “rogue”
elements and creating a sanitized web palatable to
copyrightholders.214 These draconian remedies could be
procured summarily, without a full adjudication on the merits,
and in some cases even ex parte.215 SOPA additionally provided
for more stringent criminal penalties for online streaming of
copyrighted content.216
Opposition to SOPA and PIPA first surfaced in isolated
YouTube videos posted in June 2011 by video gamers wary of
the streaming provisions, but it soon engulfed the whole
Internet.217 The wave of resistance eventually came to include
211. Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011); Preventing
Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property
Act, S. 968, 112th Cong. (2011) (known interchangeably as PIPA or PROTECT
IP); see also H.R. 3261—CRS Summary, LIBR. CONGRESS (Oct. 26, 2011),
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:HR03261:@@@D&summ2=m&
(summarizing SOPA); S. 968—CRS Summary, LIBR. CONGRESS (May 26,
2011), http://thomas.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:SN00968:@@@D&summ2=m&
(summarizing PIPA).
212. H.R. 3261; S. 968.
213. H.R. 3261; S. 968.
214. See S. 968 § 3.
215. See H.R. 3261 §§ 102–03; S. 968 §§ 3–4.
216. H.R. 3261 § 201.
217. Yafit Lev-Aretz, Copyright Lawmaking and the Public Choice: From
Legislative Battles to Private Ordering, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 203, 221
nn.139–41 (2013). See id. for a concise chronology of the events culminating in
the defeat of SOPA and PIPA, including data and statistics on the protests.
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the following: a widely observed “American Censorship Day;”218
participation in the opposition by hundreds of thousands of
websites, including BoingBoing, the Drudge Report, Facebook,
Google, Mozilla, Oatmeal, Reddit, Tumblr, Wikipedia, Wired,
and Wordpress;219 tens of thousands of blog posts written
against the bills;220 millions of letters, emails, and petitions
written to Congressmembers and the President;221 a campaign
to transfer domains away from GoDaddy, a domain-hosting
firm which had supported the legislation but was forced to
retract its support in response to the campaign;222 a campaign
to unseat Congressman Paul Ryan, who then came out against
the legislation;223 a statement in opposition by Facebook
founder Mark Zuckerberg;224 a half-day blackout by Reddit and
similar blackouts by BoingBoing and Mozilla, among others;225
a blacked out Google logo;226 and, perhaps most shocking of all,
Wikipedia’s decision to “go dark” globally for a whole day.227
Following the torrent of protest, the White House issued a
statement against the legislation228 and the bills’ supporters
dropped out one by one.229 Finally, both the House and the
Senate indefinitely postponed the bills from consideration on
January 20, 2012.230 SOPA and PIPA were dead.
218. Id. at 221.
219. Id. at 222–26.
220. Id. at 204.
221. Id. at 225–26.
222. Declan McCullagh, GoDaddy Bows to Boycott, Now ‘Opposes’ SOPA
Copyright Bill, CNET (Dec. 29, 2011, 2:03 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news
/godaddy-bows-to-boycott-now-opposes-sopa-copyright-bill/.
223. John Hudson, Reddit Forces Paul Ryan to Play Defense on SOPA,
WIRE (Dec. 29, 2011, 1:47 PM), http://www.thewire.com/politics/2011/12
/reddit-forces-paul-ryan-play-defense-sopa/46782/.
224. Lev-Aretz, supra note 217, at 225.
225. Id. at 221–23.
226. Id. at 224.
227. Id. at 222.
228. Victoria Espinel et al., Combating Online Piracy While Protecting an
Open and Innovative Internet, WE THE PEOPLE (Jan. 14, 2012, 8:09 AM),
https://wwws.whitehouse.gov/petition-tool/response/combating-online-piracy-w
hile-protecting-open-and-innovative-internet.
229. David Nguyen, SOPA Opera: Where Do Your Members of Congress
Stand on SOPA and PIPA?, PROPUBLICA, http://projects.propublica.org/sopa/
(last updated Jan. 20, 2012); Lev-Aretz, supra note 217, at 223.
230. See Senator Harry Reid, TWITTER (Jan. 20, 2012, 6:27 AM),
https://twitter.com/senatorreid/status/160367959464878080 (“In light of recent
events, I have decided to postpone Tuesday’s vote on the PROTECT IP Act
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Doesn’t this episode show that people power has triumphed
over concentrated corporate interests, that the old interest
group structure has been upended after all? Not really. The
SOPA-PIPA episode is certainly significant. It shows that
Congress cannot always get away with subordinating the
public interest to that of the copyright industry. Beyond this
general statement, however, it is unclear what lessons to draw
from the episode and how to apply them to fair use. To my
knowledge no one has distilled the causes of SOPA-PIPA’s
defeat in a way that would help us predict when pro-
copyrightholder legislation is likely to be defeated in the future,
nor has anyone sketched out a plausible account of how the
new era is different from the old. Here I will discuss two
plausible structural changes that could distinguish the new era
from the period of rightsholder dominance: (1) the rise of
content-disseminating companies such as Google and YouTube
that have an interest in greater access to copyrighted works,
and (2) the widespread availability of social media and the
Internet, which have decreased the costs of collective action
and information-sharing, making it easier for diffuse members
of the public to communicate and organize.231
The first factor is not really new. Every era has its own
new content-disseminating technology—be it radio, television,
cable, or whatever. And in many cases companies built on these
technologies eventually gain enough power to extract
concessions from copyrightholders. This is very much part of
the pattern of discrete holes in a broad fabric of expansion that
has characterized copyright legislation for decades. Indeed,
many of the specific interest group compromises in the
Copyright Act were made for content-disseminating
technologies, such as § 111(a)(3) for cable, § 119 for satellite
television, and § 512 for internet service providers.232 The rise
of better technologies for content dissemination is great news
for users, but the phenomenon is neither specific to this era nor
#PIPA”); Lamar Smith, Statement from Chairman Smith on Senate Delay of
Vote on PROTECT IP Act, GOP VOTE (Jan. 20, 2012, 1:51 PM),
http://www.texasgopvote.com/knowledge-topics/stop-sopa-pipa/statement-chair
man-smith-senate-delay-vote-protect-ip-act-003761.
231. For a discussion of the importance of social media in reducing
collective action costs, see Lev-Aretz, supra note 217, at 213–15.
232. 17 U.S.C. §§ 111(a)(3), 119, 512 (2012).
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relevant to fair use. If anything, this perspective on the SOPA-
PIPA defeat makes it seem like part of the old paradigm rather
than an exception to it.
The facilitation of user interaction through social media
and the Internet might have more explanatory power in
distinguishing this era from others. But new media alone will
not obliterate public apathy and rational ignorance. Access to
the Internet and social media has not transformed the diffuse
and uninterested public of yore into a well-organized and alert
body; mass mobilization of the kind that occurred in response
to SOPA and PIPA remains the exception. A large-scale public
reaction has not occurred in response to other Internet-age
public-domain-constricting laws, including the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA),233 the Cyber
Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act (CISPA),234 and the
233. ACTA is a multinational IP agreement signed by the United States,
Canada, Australia, and other countries in 2011, and joined by European
Union member states and other countries in 2012. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement, May 2011, available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy
/i_property/pdfs/acta1105_en.pdf; Erik Kain, Final Draft of ACTA Watered
Down, TPP Still Dangerous on IP Rules, FORBES (Jan. 2012, 9:23 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/erikkain/2012/01/28/final-draft-of-acta-watered-d
own-tpp-still-dangerous-on-ip-rules/. It has not been implemented in the
United States. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement¸ ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2014). For the White
House’s response to an online petition against ACTA, see Miram Sapira, The
Role of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), WE THE PEOPLE,
https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/response/role-anti-counterfeiting-trade-agree
ment-acta (last visited Oct. 26, 2014); see alsoMaira Sutton & Parker Higgins,
We Have Every Right to Be Furious About ACTA, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUND. (Jan. 27, 2012), http://www.webcitation.org/65Awbn3Qn (criticizing
ACTA).
234. Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, H.R. 3523, 112th
Cong. (2011). Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, H.R. 624, 113th
Cong. (2013), is a proposed law that would allow for more information-sharing
between the United States government and technology companies. It passed
the House in 2013, but remains stalled in the Senate, and the White House
has stated that President Obama would veto it. See Gerry Smith, Senate Won’t
Vote on CISPA, Deals Blow to Controversial Cyber Bill, HUFFINGTON POST
(Apr. 25, 2013, 7:13 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/25/cispa
-cyber-bill_n_3158221.html; Gerry Smith, White House Threatens CISPA Veto,
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 16, 2013, 5:18 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/2013/04/16/white-house-cispa-veto-threat_n_3094865.html. CISPA has
attracted a great deal of criticism from Internet freedom activists and other
civil liberties organizations. Karen McVeigh & Dominic Rushe, House Passes
CISPA Cybersecurity Bill Despite Warnings from White House, GUARDIAN
(Apr. 18, 2013, 5:17 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013
/apr/18/house-representatives-cispa-cybersecurity-white-house-warning. For a
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Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).235 In Yafit Lev-Aretz’s phrase,
the public is like a “sleeping giant” who is awakened only once
in a long while.236
Understanding the causes of this occasional awakening is
not an easy task. Lev-Aretz has argued that SOPA-PIPA’s
defeat was traceable to three factors.237 First, the SOPA-PIPA
protests were part of a worldwide people-power trend in 2011,
including the Arab Spring and Occupy Wall Street.238 Second,
SOPA and PIPA threatened the suppression of user-generated
content, such as people’s favorite “cute cat” videos on YouTube,
thereby targeting ordinary people in a much more direct way
than regular copyright legislation,239 which is often inaccessibly
technical. Third, the SOPA-PIPA issue somehow passed the
high threshold to trigger large-scale public engagement.240
This explanation leaves a lot to be desired. It is hard to say
whether the first factor was actually a cause or just a historical
coincidence, and Lev-Aretz does not offer any evidence
supporting the former interpretation. The second explanation—
dynamic survey and links to the criticisms and advocacy, see Cyber
Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyber_Intelligence_Sharing_and_Protection_Act
(last modified Aug. 22, 2014, 5:44 PM).
235. The TPP, currently in negotiation, is a proposed trade agreement to
include the United States, Australia, Brunei, Chile, Canada, Japan, Malaysia,
Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP), OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
http://www.ustr.gov/tpp (last visited Nov. 12, 2014). Negotiations are
occurring in secret, so the provisions of a potential law are not fully known,
but the IP provisions that have been leaked promise to be more stringent than
current American law. See TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS CHAPTER DRAFT (2011), available at
http://keepthewebopen.com/assets/pdfs/TPP%20IP%20Chapter%20Proposal.pd
f; TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS CHAPTER
SELECTED PROVISIONS (2011), available at http://www.citizenstrade.org
/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/TransPacificIP1.pdf. For an informative
interview on the TPP, see Bill Moyers, The Top Secret Trade Deal You Need to
Know About, MOYERS (Nov. 1, 2013), http://billmoyers.com/episode/full-show
-the-top-secret-trade-deal-you-need-to-know-about/.
236. Lev-Aretz, supra note 217, at 208–10.
237. Id. at 210.
238. Id. at 208–09, 256.
239. Id. at 209, 256.
240. Id. at 209–10, 256.
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the “cute cat theory of Internet censorship”241—is interesting
and potentially promising, but again no evidence is offered to
show its causal effect in the SOPA-PIPA context. It is by no
means evident that the whole uproar was about cute cat videos,
especially since the brunt of SOPA-PIPA did not fall on user-
generated content, and since such provisions could have been
severed from the law to appease the public. Finally, the third
explanation—that SOPA-PIPA passed the high threshold of
public notice—merely restates the conclusion without offering
an explanation.
To my knowledge, there are no satisfactory historical-
theoretical explanations of why SOPA-PIPA encountered
massive public resistance where many other copyright-
expanding laws do not.242 Nor have I seen a satisfactory
apportionment of responsibility for the bills’ defeat between the
general public and public-minded organizations such as the
Electronic Frontier Foundation on the one hand, and Google,
Facebook, and other large corporations on the other. The last
question is critical for purposes of fair use because it would
help us understand whether the SOPA-PIPA episode was just
another manifestation of the concentrated-versus-concentrated
dynamic or whether the diffuse public made a decisive
difference.243 If the former, then the case fits comfortably
241. The theory was first proposed by Ethan Zuckerman at the 2008
O’Reilly Emerging Technology (ETech) Conference. See Ethan Zuckerman,
The Cute Cat Theory of Digital Activism, WORLDCHANGING (Mar. 9, 2008),
http://www.worldchanging.com/archives/007877.html.
242. Scholarly accounts bearing on the SOPA-PIPA episode include: Yochai
Benkler et al., Social Mobilization and the Networked Public Sphere: Mapping
the SOPA-PIPA Debate (Berkman Ctr. Internet & Soc’y Harv. Univ., Working
Paper No. 2013-16, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2295953; Antino Kim et al., Combating Online
Piracy: The “Longer Arm” of Enforcement (Univ. Wash., Foster Sch. Bus.,
Working Paper, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2296116; see Michael A. Carrier, SOPA, PIPA, ACTA,
TPP: An Alphabet Soup of Innovation-Stifling Copyright Legislation and
Agreements, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 21 (2013); David S. Levine,
Bring in the Nerds: Secrecy, National Security and the Creation of
International Intellectual Property Law, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 105
(2012); Daniel E. O’Leary, A Twitter-Based Event Analysis of “Computer-Based
Political Action” on Intellectual Property (PIPA) 1–13 (Univ. S. Cal., Marshall
Sch. Bus., Working Paper No. ACC 01.13, 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2185651.
243. See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text for a general discussion
on concentrated and diffuse interests, supra text accompanying notes 132–50
for the concentrated-versus-diffuse example of the CTEA, and supra text
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within the existing public choice framework;244 if the latter,
then we would want to isolate the factors that contributed to
public engagement and harness them in future cases in which
the public interest is at stake.
The upshot is that the SOPA-PIPA episode is difficult to
understand, and existing accounts don’t do it justice. Moreover,
SOPA-PIPA’s defeat does not save any of the proposed
legislative fair use fixes surveyed above because they do not
draw in any way on the experience of that defeat; in fact, as far
as I can tell, they all appeared before SOPA and PIPA were
defeated. The happy outcome in this one case simply does not
excuse the legislative reform proposals’ general inattention to
legislative dynamics. To better understand the causes of the
SOPA-PIPA defeat and its implications for copyright legislation
and public choice theory is an unanswered call for political
scientists, legal scholars, and economists. Only after the call is
answered can we begin to understand what lessons, if any, to
take away for fair use policy. Meanwhile, we cannot ignore
legislative dynamics if we want Congress to fix fair use.
C. SUMMARY OF CRITIQUE
The foregoing analysis of the political economy of copyright
legislation exposes the unrealistic nature of academic proposals
for Congress to legislate in a way that would reduce
copyrightholders’ power. Quite the contrary, the available
evidence indicates that if Congress acts at all, it would likely be
to increase the power of copyrightholders vis-à-vis users and
second-generation creators. Congressional “reform” of fair use
will probably be either nonexistent or counterproductive.
This analysis should not be taken to deprecate the exercise
of ideal theory. Normative theories are of course needed, and it
is beneficial sometimes to ignore important features of reality
in building our theories. In fact the opposite tendency—the
exercise of presenting a practical second-best solution as the
theoretical first choice—can just as well be criticized.245 But the
accompanying notes 107–13, 151–54 for the concentrated-versus-concentrated
examples of the 1976 Copyright Act and the FMLA.
244. See supra Part IV.
245. See Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics
Trims Its Sails and Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1593, 1596, 1597 (2014)
(criticizing the behavioral law and economics movement for failing to “pursue
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fair use reformists are not offering ideal theory proper; they are
presenting what they purport to be commonsense practical
solutions. These proposals are neither packaged as, nor have
the necessary rigor to be taken seriously as, ideal theory. Any
virtue they might possess lies in their practical appeal. And
you cannot have practical appeal if you ignore practical
realities.
VI. WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
This Article so far has criticized easy fixes. I’ve argued that
the same problems which make present copyright law such a
mess render many academic reform proposals impossible. It
would be silly, then, if I were to turn around and offer my own
easy fix. But just because the proposals for Congress to fix fair
use are hopeless does not mean that we should give up on
copyright reform altogether. This section accordingly discusses
more plausible avenues of reform.
A. NON-LEGISLATIVE REFORMS, COURTS, AND THE
CONSTITUTIONALDIMENSION
There are many ways of improving fair use that do not
require congressional legislation. In a recent book review,
Pamela Samuelson mentions ten such ways.246 Reform through
several of these venues—namely, a congressionally created
commission on copyright reform, a (reestablished) Office of
Technology Assessment (OTA), and the Copyright Office—
would require specific congressional action, if not actual
legislation, and as such would encounter similar public choice
problems as the proposals critiqued above.247 Other reform
venues mentioned by Samuelson—namely, the federal courts,
the publication of treatises, a Copyright Principles project of
the full implications of its own underlying social science” and “artificial
truncation” of reform proposals in the interest of offering solutions that would
be more politically palatable).
246. Pamela Samuelson, Is Copyright Reform Possible?, 126 HARV. L. REV.
740, 764–69 (2013) (reviewing MAZZONE, supra note 56, and PATRY, supra
note 56) (discussing copyright reform broadly, but it applies equally to fair use
in particular).
247. The same can probably be said of reform through U.S. Intellectual
Property Enforcement Coordinator (IPEC, or the “IP Czar”). See Samuelson,
supra note 246, at 765. The public choice problems afflicting executive
agencies, however, could potentially be different from those plaguing
Congress. See id. at 764 n.122, 765.
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the American Law Institute (ALI), private ordering, social
norms, and international agreements—appear more
promising.248
This list is not exhaustive. One may add the preparation of
guidelines and best-practices manuals;249 the work of
independent nongovernmental organizations, monitoring
groups, and law school clinics;250 reports and recommendations
by presidential commissions;251 and other possibilities. Each
248. See id. at 766–69.
249. See, e.g., PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, RECLAIMING FAIR
USE: HOW TO PUT BALANCE BACK IN COPYRIGHT (2011), available at
http://www.cmsimpact.org/sites/default/files/UNTOLDSTORIES_Report.pdf;
CTR. FOR MEDIA & SOC. IMPACT, THE CODE OF BEST PRACTICES IN FAIR USE
FORMEDIA LITERACY EDUCATION (n.d), available at http://www.cmsimpact.org
/fair-use/related-materials/codes/code-best-practices-fair-use-media-literacy-ed
ucation#code (last visited Nov. 13, 2014); L. Ray Patterson, Regents Guide to
Understanding Copyright and Educational Fair Use, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 244
(1997); Guidelines on the Fair Use of Copyrighted Works by Law Libraries, AM.
ASSOC. LAW LIBR. (June 2014), http://www.aallnet.org/mm/Advocacy
/recommendedguidelines/policy-fair.html. But see Kenneth D. Crews, The Law
of Fair Use and the Illusion of Fair-Use Guidelines, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 599
(2001) (criticizing various guidelines that “attempt to define the scope of fair
use for specific applications . . . .”).
250. These organizations include, for example, Center for Democracy and
Technology, see About CDT, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH.,
https://cdt.org/about/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2014); Chilling Effects, see
CHILLING EFFECTS, https://www.chillingeffects.org (last visited Nov. 13, 2014);
Electronic Frontier Foundation, see About EFF, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUND., https://www.eff.org/about (last visited Nov. 13, 2014); Free Software
Foundation, see About FSF, FREE SOFTWARE FOUND.,
http://www.fsf.org/about/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2014); NYU Technology Law
and Policy Clinic, see NYU Technology Law and Policy Clinic, NYU LAW,
http://www.law.nyu.edu/academics/clinics/semester/technologylawandpolicy
(last visited Nov. 13, 2014); Public Knowledge, see About Us, PUBLIC
KNOWLEDGE, https://www.publicknowledge.org/about-us/ (last visited Nov. 13,
2014); and Samuelson Law, Technology & Public Policy Clinic, see Samuelson
Law, Technology & Public Policy Clinic, BERKELEY L., U. CAL.,
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/samuelsonclinic.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2014).
251. See, e.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES (2011); JAMES A. BAKER, III ET AL., IRAQ STUDY
GROUP REPORT (2006); 9/11 COMM’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES (2004);
PRESIDENT’S SPECIAL REVIEW BD., TOWER COMMISSION REPORT (1987);
PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK
FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE (1967). It is exceedingly unlikely that such a
commission would be established to inquire into copyright, as the subject has
not reached the level to be considered a national crisis.
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venue or modality of reform comes with its own advantages and
disadvantages, and its own version of collective action and
public choice problems. Samuelson’s focus is on a potential ALI
Copyright Principles project.252 I would like to concentrate here
on the federal courts.
The federal courts are the most natural venue for fair use
reform. It was judges who gave us fair use in the first place.253
And much of what is pro-user in fair use, as in the rest of
copyright, comes from judge-made law—the rule of Sony,254 the
freedom to parody,255 the allowance for mass digitization in the
public interest,256 the permission to include thumbnail images
of photographs in search-engine results,257 the protection for
intermediate copying of software on the way to reverse
engineering,258 and so forth. Indeed, the law of fair use is pretty
much all judge-made common law. It is only natural, then, that
those who seek to improve fair use should look to the federal
courts.
And they do. There are many who actively work, not
without considerable success, to improve fair use by helping to
shape copyright litigation in the federal courts. The list
includes the Center for Democracy and Technology, Chilling
252. See Samuelson, supra note 246, at 770–78.
253. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
254. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 442, 454–
56 (1984) (holding that the sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other
articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if the
product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes, even if it is
merely capable of substantial noninfringing uses, and that recording a
broadcast television program for later home viewing, or “time shifting,” is fair
use).
255. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (holding
that making a rap version of a pop song may be fair use, in light of the rap
song’s parody elements, and reversing the appellate court’s determination that
the commercial nature of the song precluded a fair use finding).
256. See Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014)
(holding that digitizing the print collections of university libraries for the
purpose of enabling full-text searches and providing access to visually disabled
persons is fair use); Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding that the Google Books project, pursuant to which
Google has digitized and made text-searchable the contents of more than
twenty million books in the collection of several research libraries, is fair use).
257. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir.
2007); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).
258. See Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 598
(9th Cir. 2000).
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Effects, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the Free Software
Foundation, the NYU Technology Law and Policy Clinic, Public
Knowledge, and the Samuelson Law, Technology & Public
Policy Clinic, among many others.259 These organizations and
their law-professor members bring lawsuits,260 defend
lawsuits,261 write amicus briefs,262 compile facts, and issue
reports263 to raise judicial awareness of copyright abuses and
alert judges to the downside of copyright expansionism.264
259. See sources cited supra note 250.
260. See, e.g., Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D.
Cal. 2008).
261. See, e.g., Righthaven LLC v. Hoehn, 716 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2013);
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 419 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir.
2005); Astrolabe v. Olson, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org
/cases/astrolabe-v-olson (last visited Nov. 13, 2014) (advocacy group
summarizing the factual issues and dismissal of the case).
262. See, e.g., Brief for the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Public
Knowledge, and the Center for Democracy & Technology as Amici Curiae
Supporting Appellees, Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir.
2014) (No. 12-4547-CV); Brief of Digital Humanities and Law Scholars as
Amici Curiae in Support of Defendants-Appellees and Affirmance, Authors
Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014) (No. 12-4547-CV); Brief of
25 Intellectual Property Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner, Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013) (No.
11–697); Brief of Amici Curiae Public Knowledge et al. in Support of
Petitioner, Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013) (No.
11–697); Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation et al., Viacom
Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012) (Nos. 10–3270–cv, 10–
3342–cv); Brief of Amici Curiae Chilling Effects Clearinghouse Leaders in
Support of Appellee, Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th
Cir. 2007) (Nos. 06–55405, 06–55406, 06–55425, 06–55759, 06–55854, 06–
55877); Amicus Curiae Brief of the Electronic Frontier Foundation et al. in
Support of Google, Inc., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146
(9th Cir. 2007) (Nos. 06–55405, 06–55406, 06–55425, 06–55759, 06–55854, 06–
55877); Brief of George Akerlof et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01–618).
263. See, e.g., PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, CTR. FOR SOC.
MEDIA, UNTOLD STORIES: CREATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF THE RIGHTS
CLEARANCE CULTURE FOR DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS (2004), available at
http://www.cmsimpact.org/sites/default/files/UNTOLDSTORIES_Report.pdf;
MARJORIE HEINS & TRICIA BECKLES, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, WILL FAIR
USE SURVIVE? FREE EXPRESSION IN THE AGE OF COPYRIGHT CONTROL (2005),
available at http://www.fepproject.org/policyreports/WillFairUseSurvive.pdf.
264. Of course, the same actors also work in areas other than litigation.
The Electronic Frontier Foundation, for example, monitors and participates in
the DMCA rulemaking process. See DMCA Rulemaking, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/dmca-rulemaking (last visited
Nov. 13, 2014).
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Scholars also write law review articles discussing how judges
should interpret the fair use doctrine. At least two of these
articles, Professor Gordon’s Fair Use as Market Failure and
Judge Leval’s Toward a Fair Use Standard,265 appear to have
had significant influence on fair use jurisprudence.266
Doctrinal scholarship on fair use has become all the more
important since the Supreme Court declared that the doctrine
might be of constitutional import. The Supreme Court’s recent
record on constitutional copyright law is poor. In Eldred v.
Ashcroft, decided in 2003,267 and Golan v. Holder, decided in
2012,268 the Court rejected constitutional challenges to
copyright-expanding legislation, dealing a heavy blow to those
who had hoped that courts would recognize meaningful
constitutional limits on copyright expansion.269 But although
Eldred and Golan signaled that a majority of Supreme Court
Justices perceives nearly no constitutional limits on
congressional policymaking in the copyright area,270 they did
leave a thin ray of hope for advocates of constitutional limits.
First, the majority did not retreat from the longstanding
American insistence on the centrality of the economic or
utilitarian justification for copyright. In both opinions, the
Court remained true to the constitutional criterion that
copyright exists to “promote the progress of science”—that is, to
incentivize the creation and dissemination of valuable products
265. Gordon, supra note 8; Leval, supra note 8.
266. See Netanel, supra note 30, at 734–36 (noting “Gordon’s highly
influential” article cited in Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 478 (1984) and Leval’s article cited
in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569, 576 (1994)).
267. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
268. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).
269. Eldred involved challenges to the CTEA under the Copyright Clause
and the First Amendment. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 193. Golan involved challenges
under the same sources to § 514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act
(URAA), 17 U.S.C. § 104A, which extended copyright protection to foreign
works that had previously been in the public domain. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 875,
881–82. For a dissection of the reasoning of these decisions, see Shahshahani,
supra note 134.
270. This sense is captured by the title of a case note published in the wake
of Golan: Jessica W. Rice, Note, “The Devil Take the Hindmost”: Copyright’s
Freedom from Constitutional Constraints after Golan v. Holder, 161 U. PA. L.
REV. ONLINE 283 (2013), available at http://www.pennlawreview.com/online
/161-U-Pa-L-Rev-Online-283.pdf.
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of the mind.271 A contrary conclusion, for example the Court’s
embrace of a “moral rights” or “natural rights” conception,
would have practically removed all constitutional fetters by
allowing Congress to legislate in the service of ends that have
no ascertainable limiting principle.
Second, and vitally for present purposes, the Court held
that fair use is of constitutional import. Writing for the
majority in Eldred, Justice Ginsburg observed that copyright
contains “built-in First Amendment accommodations,”272 and
singled out the idea-expression dichotomy and the fair use
doctrine as examples of such built-in accommodations.273 The
Court went on to say, “the D.C. Circuit spoke too broadly when
it declared copyrights ‘categorically immune from challenges
under the First Amendment.’ But when, as in this case,
Congress has not altered the traditional contours of copyright
protection, further First Amendment scrutiny is
unnecessary.”274 Golan repeated much the same language
about “traditional contours” (with the difference that, this time,
fair use and the idea-expression dichotomy were named as the
only inviolable “contours”).275
To recognize a constitutional aspect in fair use is
consonant with the foregoing discussion of public choice.276 As
271. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 888–89 (holding that promoting the progress
of science embraces not only incentives for creation but also incentives for
dissemination); Eldred, 537 U.S. at 212 (affirming that “the primary objective
of copyright is to promote the Progress of Science”) (citation omitted).
272. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219.
273. Id. at 219–20.
274. Id. at 221 (quoting Eldred v. Reno, 239 F. 3d 372, 375 (2001)).
275. The Court in Golan rejected the petitioners’ First Amendment
challenge, finding it doomed by the “pathmarking decision in Eldred.” Golan,
132 S. Ct. at 889. In explaining the relationship between the Copyright Clause
and the First Amendment, the Court mostly repeated Eldred’s analysis, but
also added a new twist: Eldred, said the Golan Court, “described the
‘traditional contours’ of copyright protection, i.e., the ‘idea/expression
dichotomy’ and the ‘fair use’ defense.” Id. at 890. Eldred had been unclear
about whether idea-expression and fair use are the only elements of the
“traditional contours” set; the phrase “i.e.” in the quoted sentence from Golan
suggests that they are. This suggestion was more clearly confirmed in a
footnote, which stated, “[o]n the initial appeal in this case, the Tenth Circuit
gave an unconfined reading to our reference in Eldred to ‘traditional contours
of copyright.’ That reading was incorrect, as we here clarify.” Id. at 890 n.29
(citations omitted).
276. See supra Part IV.
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that discussion showed, the political economy of copyright
legislation is such that the rightsholders get their way and the
general public is unheard, resulting in a relentless and
counterproductive expansion of copyrights. In such a climate,
the usual justifications for leaving economic legislation to the
democratic process do not hold. For even if the issues at hand
require consideration of a huge amount of data, the input of
experts, and the views of various affected interests—tasks that
seem to be more suited to the legislative and executive
branches, with their larger staff, longer timeframes, and
greater powers of collecting and analyzing data and receiving
public input—the question of institutional competence is beside
the point because the institution is not exercising its
competence. The legislative process of copyright is one of
dispensing private favors, not of calibrating the laws to the
public interest. This is the result of public choice problems
occasioned by copyright law’s interest group structure. The
judiciary, not being subject to the same public choice problems,
is well positioned to step in.
This is not some newfangled notion of judicial
interventionism. To be sure, the public choice literature’s
insights into the power of concentrated interests are relatively
recent (decades, not centuries, old).277 But the idea that the
function of judicial review by an independent judiciary is to
correct for the deficiencies of the democratic political process is
as old as the idea of judicial review itself.278 Federalist 78
attempts to justify the idea of life tenure (“during good
behavior”) as an “indispensable ingredient” to an independent
judiciary.279 In the course of this, Alexander Hamilton defends
judicial review on a number of grounds, prominent among
277. See sources cited supra note 85.
278. I am aware of objections to the usefulness of the “independent
judiciary” concept. See Lewis A. Kornhauser, Is Judicial Independence a
Useful Concept?, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 45 (Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman
eds., 2002). But I use the phrase here as shorthand to denote the political
insulation, from popular opinion as well as the legislature and the executive,
provided to federal judges by Article III of the Constitution, and I find it to be
a useful shorthand.
279. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465–66 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961).
2015] NIRVANA FALLACY 327
which is the tendency of an unchecked democratic process to
oppress minorities:280
This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the
Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill
humors, which the arts of designing men, or the influence of
particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the people
themselves, and which, though they speedily give place to better
information, and more deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the
meantime, to occasion dangerous innovations in the government,
and serious oppressions of the minor party in the community.281
The connection between the robustness of judicial review
and the breakdown of the regular democratic process was also
elaborated in the famous footnote four of United States v.
Carolene Products Co., which laid the foundation for the idea of
levels of scrutiny now familiar to every student of American
constitutional law.282 In Carolene Products the Supreme Court
rejected a constitutional challenge to a federal statute that
criminalized the shipment of “filled milk” (skim milk made to
resemble whole milk) in interstate commerce.283 The Court
stated that “regulatory legislation affecting ordinary
commercial transactions” should not be held unconstitutional
unless “it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption
that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge
and experience of the legislators.”284 This is the familiar, easy
rational-basis review. But, the Court cautioned in footnote four:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a
specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten
Amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be
embraced within the Fourteenth.
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts
those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring
about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more
exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the
Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation . . . .
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the
review of statutes directed at particular religious, or national, or
racial minorities . . . whether prejudice against discrete and insular
280. See id. at 466–70.
281. Id. at 469.
282. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 (1938).
283. Id. at 154.
284. Id. at 152.
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minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to
curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.285
What, one might ask, has all this got to do with the
political economy of copyright? The concern in these canonical
sources appears to be with the tyranny of the majority and the
oppression of “discrete and insular minorities.”286 The picture I
have painted, by contrast, shows the outsized power of
minorities.
The connection is that the concern of Hamilton and
Madison in The Federalist and of Justice Stone in Carolene
Products was not with minority status per se, but with the lack
of voice in the political process that minority status entails.
What calls for judicial solicitude for minorities is not the simple
fact that they are minorities; no one can argue that minorities
are intrinsically “more equal than others” before the law.287
The point, rather, is that minorities were thought more likely
to be voiceless in the democratic political process—democracy,
after all, means majority rule288—and therefore appropriate
subjects of protection by a source from without that process.
The relation between minority status and political process is
apparent when one reflects on the second and third paragraphs
of footnote four, which discuss political process and minorities
respectively.289 A focus on that relation is the only way to make
285. Id. at 152–53 n.4 (citations omitted).
286. Id.
287. Cf. GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 148 (Harcourt, Brace & Co. 1946)
(1945) (“All animals are equal but some animals are more equal than others.”).
288. See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17,
1788), in 1 THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN
THOMAS JEFFERSON AND JAMES MADISON 1776–1826, 566 (James Morton
Smith ed., 1st ed. 1995) (“Where the power is in the few it is natural for them
to sacrifice the many to their own partialities and corruptions. Where the
power, as with us, is in the many not in the few, the danger can not be very
great that the few will be thus favored. It is much more to be dreaded that the
few will be unnecessarily sacrificed to the many.”). This quote underlines
public choice theory’s contribution to the understanding of political power in a
democracy since the Founders’ time: it adds a concern about minority
oppression of the majority in a democracy to the Founders’ concern about
majority oppression of the minority.
289. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4
(1938); cf. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW 76 (1980) (“The first paragraph [of footnote four] is pure
interpretivism: it says the Court should enforce the ‘specific’ provisions of the
Constitution. We’ve seen, though, that interpretivism is incomplete: there are
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sense of the Founders’ (and Justice Stone’s) special solicitude
for minorities. It does not make sense to say that minority
status per se entitles one to special protection.290
Once the connection between minority status and political
process is understood, the relevance of public choice theory
becomes evident. What is relatively new is the well-supported
insight that certain majorities are systematically likely to be
voiceless in the political process; what is ancient is the logic
that the judiciary ought to show special concern for the
voiceless. The application of the ancient principle to the
relatively new insights yields the proposition that the judiciary
ought to show special concern not just for voiceless minorities
but for voiceless majorities as well.291 The latter are just as
oppressible as the former. They need a constitutional bulwark
provisions in the Constitution that call for more. The second and third
paragraphs give us a version of what that more might be. Paragraph two
suggests that it is an appropriate function of the Court to keep the machinery
of democratic government running as it should, to make sure the channels of
political participation and communication are kept open. Paragraph three
suggests that the Court should also concern itself with what majorities do to
minorities, particularly mentioning laws ‘directed at’ religious, national, and
racial minorities and those infected by prejudice against them.”) (citations
omitted).
290. ELY, supra note 289, at 151 argues for a “participation-oriented,
representation-reinforcing approach to judicial review,” and seems to accept a
similar understanding of the significance of minority status.
[A] “discrete and insular minorities” approach, at least one that
refuses to attend to why the minority in question is discrete and
insular, also turns out to be less than entirely tenable. Perhaps the
most obvious objection is one it is always east to make, that courts
aren’t qualified to engage in this kind of practical political
analysis . . . . Should the inquiry turn out to be constitutionally
appropriate, however, we would want to ask—even admitting courts
will have trouble (which may just mean that they should intervene
only in reasonably clear cases)—whether any other institution is
better situated to make it, and the answer to that question seems
clearly to be no. The whole point of the approach is to identify those
groups in society to whose needs and wishes elected officials have no
apparent interest in attending. If the approach makes sense, it would
not make sense to assign its enforcement to anyone but the courts.
Id.
291. Conversely, a well-supported finding that certain minorities are not as
voiceless in the political process as they were once thought to be would seem to
support the conclusion that special judicial solicitude for them is no longer
warranted. Whether and to what extent this might be the case in various
situations is beyond the scope of this work.
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watched over by the courts. We might call this the phenomenon
of “discrete and insular majorities,” a phenomenon nowhere
more apparent than in copyright legislation.292 The Supreme
Court’s conclusion that fair use is of constitutional import is
therefore a welcome development.293
Fair use’s recently recognized constitutional dimension
makes relevant doctrinal scholarship all the more interesting
and important. Incorporating speech-related considerations
from the First Amendment and “progress of science”
considerations from the Copyright Clause could make
scholarship about the proper judicial interpretation of fair use
richer and more challenging.294 It could also make such
scholarship more important because, to the extent certain
interpretations of fair use might be constitutionally required,
they cannot be overruled by ordinary congressional legislation.
All of this adds to the value of reform efforts through federal
courts.
I don’t think the importance of doctrinal scholarship on fair
use is unnoticed, given the influence of previous landmark
292. My concern here is with copyright in particular, but others have
advanced more general theories of judicial review based on public choice. See,
e.g., ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION (2000); Farber &
Frickey, Jurisprudence of Public Choice, supra note 85; Macey, supra note 85;
Mashaw, supra note 85.
293. The Court made a terrible mistake, however, in holding that fair use
and the idea-expression dichotomy are the only constitutional safeguards
within copyright. See Shahshahani, supra note 134.
294. There already exists a vast body of scholarship on the relationship
between copyright and the First Amendment. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Free
as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the
Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999); Robert C. Denicola, Copyright
and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the Protection of Expression,
67 CALIF. L. REV. 283 (1979); Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First
Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983 (1970); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene
Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48
DUKE L.J. 147 (1998); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the
First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2001); Melville B. Nimmer, Does
Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and
Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1970); L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech,
Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1987); Jed Rubenfeld, The
Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1 (2002);
Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech
and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535 (2004); Diane Leenheer
Zimmerman, Information as Speech, Information as Goods: Some Thoughts on
Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights, 33 WM. &MARY L. REV. 665 (1992).
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doctrinal articles.295 The same goes for more practical reform
efforts through litigation, which, as described, are alive and
well.296 So one wonders why a rising share of scholarship is
devoted to advocating legislative reforms that are essentially
impossible, instead of the more traditional law professors’ work
of arguing about how existing laws should be interpreted. The
remainder of this section will explore philosophical and
practical arguments against judicial rulemaking to see whether
they could justify this shift of focus on the part of some
scholars.
B. PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST JUDICIAL
RULEMAKING
One possible reason to focus on legislative, rather than
judicial, solutions is a principled objection to unelected courts
making the law in such an important area. I doubt that, as a
positive matter, such compunctions are presently preventing
advocates of copyright reform from advocating their preferred
judicial interpretation. The courts are making fair use law; the
only question is how they will make it. As a normative matter,
however, it is important to engage with the argument that
courts are not the proper institution to make fair use law,
especially constitutional fair use law.
Taking as a given the apparent fact that the substantive
failings of recent copyright legislation are evident to most
copyright scholars—i.e., most scholars (though with notable
exceptions) agree that copyright has expanded far beyond its
optimal bounds297—one is still left with questions about the
legislative process. Are the public choice “problems” described
above really problems, and do they justify judicial intervention,
especially in the form of constitutional review? Two arguments
for answering “no” to these questions are worth discussing.
First, one can say, as Alexander Bickel did, that even if
small interest groups control the legislature, that control is still
obtained and exercised via democratic means and is thus
295. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
296. See supra text accompanying notes 251–56.
297. For expressions of the majority view, see supra notes 98, 102, 106. For
the minority view, see, for example, RONALD CASS & KEITH HYLTON, LAWS OF
CREATION (2012); ROBERT MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
(2011).
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preferable on the score of process to judicial decisionmaking.298
This objection is not fatal. It amounts, at least in the form
stated by Bickel, to a love of elections for election’s sake
(accepting, arguendo, Bickel’s equation of democracy with
elections). But to hold an irrebuttable presumption in favor of
the procedural superiority of elections would be to assume the
conclusion that leaving matters to the democratic branches is
always best, and the procedural question about judicial review
would not even be worth asking. I accept that we should start
with the premise that the democratic process is procedurally
preferable, but that premise is neither self-sufficient nor
always true. It is not self-sufficient because the procedural
preference for elections lies not in some magical quality of
elections per se but in their tendency to preserve autonomy and
self-rule, which are the procedural virtues of democracy, and it
is not always true because they do not always do that. So it is
possible to rebut the presumptive procedural superiority of the
democratic process by showing that the process does not
further the autonomy values usually associated with it. The
public choice reasons I have given above count as just such a
showing.299 Even if the problems recounted above do not
eliminate the procedural reasons for leaving copyright
legislation entirely to the democratic branches, they at least
substantially reduce their force.300
298. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 19 (1962) (“And if the control is
exercised by ‘groups of various types and sizes, all seeking in various ways to
advance their goals,’ so that we have ‘minorities rule’ rather than majority
rule, it remains true nevertheless that only those minorities rule which can
command the votes of a majority of individuals in the legislature who can
command the votes of a majority of individuals in the electorate . . . . [N]othing
can finally depreciate the central function that is assigned in democratic
theory and practice to the electoral process; nor can it be denied that the
policy-making power of representative institutions, born of the electoral
process, is the distinguishing characteristic of the system. Judicial review
works counter to this characteristic.”).
299. See supra Part IV.
300. There is also another consideration that weakens the force of process-
based critiques of judicial policymaking. Namely, a large and growing body of
empirical literature, produced primarily by political scientists, has shown that
the federal courts (the Supreme Court in particular) are substantially
influenced by public opinion in their constitutional decisionmaking. See, e.g.,
TOM S. CLARK, THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE (2011); Christopher J.
Casillas et al., How Public Opinion Constrains the U.S. Supreme Court, 55
AM. J. POL. SCI. 74 (2011); Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy:
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The second procedural objection goes deeper. Einer
Elhauge has pointed out that the findings of public choice
theory are positive, not normative, and has argued it would be
a mistake to draw a normative conclusion from them.301 It is
meaningless, he says, to talk about the “disproportionate
influence” of groups without having a normative baseline of
how much influence is proportionate.302 And, because no
adequate normative baseline exists, we cannot jump to the
conclusion that what public choice describes is really a
problem.303
I would like to say two things about this objection. First, it
does not weaken the argument for robust judicial review.
Second, it is wrong anyway. With respect to the first point, the
conclusion of Elhauge’s analysis is that there is no such thing
as proper process; it is all about outcomes.304 But if you accept
The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957);
William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a
Countermajoritarian Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme
Court Decisions, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 87 (1993). A critical evaluation of these
empirical studies is beyond the scope of this Article. Suffice it to say that the
overwhelming thrust of their findings undermines the argument that judicial
decisionmaking is unresponsive to majoritarian preferences, just as the public
choice literature undermines the conviction that the legislative process is
responsive above all to majoritarian preferences.
301. See Elhauge, supra note 77, at 48–59.
302. Id. at 48, 51.
303. Id. at 50–59 (identifying “economic,” “egalitarian,” and “majoritarian”
baselines and arguing that they are unsatisfactory). One might interpret
Elhauge as arguing not that adequate independent normative baselines do not
exist, but that such baselines are not supplied by public choice itself. There
are passages in his article that could be read this way. See id. at 49 (“The
condemnation of the political process draws any persuasiveness it has from
the underlying normative theory rather than from interest group theory.”); id.
at 54 (“[I]nterest group theory provides no reason for changing whatever view
one holds about the attraction of . . . a normative standard.”). But if that is all
he is saying, he has not said much. It is fairly obvious that the predictions of
public choice theory are positive, not normative. Public choice does not supply
normative baselines by itself, but its insights about the vulnerabilities of the
democratic process might provide good cause to reevaluate our reverence for
democratic decision making by showing that it is out of line with our
normative baseline. So, if Elhauge’s critique of the relevance of public choice is
to have any bite at all, it must be a critique of the normative baselines as well.
I think Elhauge recognizes this, and that is why he spends so much time
arguing that various normative baselines are inadequate. See id. at 50–59.
304. See, e.g., id. at 48 (“[I]nterest group theory provides us with no reason
to condemn (or approve) the operation of the political process that stands
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that, then you would not have a procedural preference for
leaving copyright legislation to Congress anyway. And if that is
so, then the clearly evident substantive problems with
copyright legislation should be sufficient to recommend robust
judicial review.
Second, Elhauge is wrong anyway. Although he is correct
to draw attention to the fact that public choice analysis is
positive and cannot by itself supply normative conclusions, he
is mistaken to think there exists no adequate normative
baseline of proper influence. Consider these two possible
candidates for a normative baseline (and bear in mind we are
talking about process here, not outcomes): (1) a group should
have influence roughly proportional to its interests; (2) a group
should have influence roughly proportional to the number of
natural persons belonging to it.305 Both of these seem logically
plausible, in tune with the procedural intuitions people have in
independent of our condemnation (or approval) of the results of that political
process.”); id. at 49 (“[C]ondemning the political process because of interest
group influence is indistinguishable from condemning the political process for
producing outcomes the condemner dislikes on independent normative
grounds.”); id. at 62 (“[I]nterest group theory offers no reason for condemning
our political process that stands independent of our condemnation of the
results of that political process.”).
305. Levine and Forrence have introduced a more sophisticated procedural
baseline by distinguishing “general-interest policies” from “special-interest
policies.” See Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture,
Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 167, 176 (1990) (“General-interest policies or actions are those policies or
actions adopted or undertaken by a regulatory agent that would be ratified by
the general polity according to its accepted aggregation principles if the
information, organization (including exclusion costs), and transaction and
monitoring costs of the general polity were zero. In other words, they would be
adopted by a polity uninhibited by the problems identified by Downs, Olson,
and modern agency theorists. Special-interest policies or actions are those that
would only be ratified by a self-interested subset of a polity.”). This
conceptualization is introduced in an attempt to produce a positive theory that
would permit the identification of regulatory capture independent of the
normative desirability of its outcome. See id. at 178 (“The capture debate can
be most profitably pursued as a debate about domination of the regulatory
process, and not about motivation or about the ultimate goodness of policy.
‘Capture’ is best analyzed in terms of the distinction between general and
special interests. ‘Capture’ is the adoption by the regulator for self-regarding
(private) reasons, such as enhancing electoral support or postregulatory
compensation, of a policy which would not be ratified by an informed polity
free of organization costs.”). For present purposes, I will keep to the two
simple candidates identified in the main text, but I realize that more
sophisticated procedural baselines might be helpful for other purposes.
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favor of democracy, and true to the procedural virtues of
autonomy and self-rule.
The first candidate, I realize, is vulnerable to the objection
that it is not really a procedural baseline because it is keyed to
welfare-maximizing outcomes. Elhauge argues that under
traditional assumptions of economic analysis, if the influence of
conflicting groups is roughly proportional to their interests,
then the group with the most at stake wins, which means that
the resulting outcome is value-maximizing because it results in
the allocation that is most highly valued.306 If that is so, then
we would not have gained any additional traction by adding a
procedural dimension to our normative assessment. “One may
as well immediately move to the issue of whether the resulting
law is efficient.”307
This is true, but only in abstract, under strong
assumptions, and in the very long run. In practice, we might
have a normative preference for the types of procedure that in
the long run would tend to produce good outcomes, while
recognizing that the confluence of proper procedure and proper
outcome is not perfect. If it is possible for processes that
generally produce good outcomes to not produce good outcomes
in certain particular instances (which is emphatically the case
in the real world), and if we believe that the long-run net gains
to be had from maintaining good processes sometimes outweigh
the net gains of trying to tailor the procedure to the outcome in
every case, then it is worth having recourse to normative
assessments of both process and outcome.308
In any event, the second candidate for a normative
procedural baseline—that a group should have influence
roughly proportional to the number of natural persons
belonging to it—avoids even the perceived problems with the
first candidate. This baseline seems purely procedural and in
306. See Elhauge, supra note 77, at 55.
307. Id.
308. One might respond that if that is the case we might as well do away
with outcome-based evaluations and just stick to process. But that does not
follow. First, a process baseline that is keyed to outcomes in the long run
cannot exist without having an outcome baseline to begin with. Second, it is
possible that the net gains from maintaining good processes outweigh the net
gains from shooting only for good outcomes in some cases but not in others, in
which event we would want to have both process- and outcome-based
evaluations handy.
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line with general pro-democracy intuitions. It is one way of
stating the principle of “one person, one vote”—or, more
accurately, “one person, one iota of influence.”
Elhauge’s answer is that “majoritarian baselines are
normatively unattractive because they do not account for the
varying intensity of individual preferences.”309 It is possible, in
other words, for a proposal to help more people than it hurts
but to hurt so badly that it results in a net welfare loss (and
vice versa).310
But this answer is all confused. Elhauge has now made the
exact same outcome-process conflation that he accused the pro-
judicial review camp of making. Of course the process baseline
will not always match the outcome baseline; that is the point of
having a separate process baseline. As Elhauge himself pointed
out, if the good process always converged with the good
outcome, there would be no point to evaluating them
separately.311 So the argument that satisfactory normative
baselines of proper influence do not exist is wrong.
I could dwell on these points longer, but that would take
the discussion even farther from copyright without adding
much to the analysis. The bottom line is this: the process of
copyright legislation is broken, no matter what procedural
baseline we use to evaluate it. There is no reasonable
procedural baseline by which Congress’s facilitation of the
copyright industry’s appropriation of ever-increasing property
rights to the detriment of consumers, users, and downstream
creators is desirable. And the broken process is generating bad
outcomes like the CTEA—outcomes that are out of whack with
the constitutional standard of promoting the progress of
knowledge and do not advance the public interest more
generally.312 All of this erodes the usual bases for maximal
deference to the legislature in the area of economic policy.
309. Elhauge, supra note 77, at 59.
310. Id. at 50–52, 64–65.
311. Id. at 66. One might ask how to reconcile procedural and substantive
values in the event that they collide, but such a question does not arise here
because copyright legislation exhibits both a broken process and bad
outcomes.
312. See supra text accompanying notes 132–35.
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C. PRACTICAL ARGUMENTSAGAINST JUDICIAL RULEMAKING
Even if there are no good reasons in principle for opposing
fair use reform through courts, there might be good practical
reasons for doing so. As discussed above, the central failing of
many fair use critics is that, instead of comparing different
imperfect institutions to each other, they compare the real
world with an ideal state.313 I would be indulging in the same
nirvana fallacy if I were to offer up the judiciary as an
institution exempt from public choice—one that could solve all
the problems attendant to copyright legislation while itself
being magically immune to them.314 Potential public choice
problems and other institutional shortcomings of the courts
should be considered when offering them up as an alternative
locus of reform. If it turns out the federal courts are even more
susceptible to capture by rightsholders than Congress, then
reform through courts is likely to be counterproductive.
It is not hard to see, however, that this is not the case. The
same public choice problems plaguing the legislative process
simply do not apply to the courts. There are many bad things
one can say about the federal courts; that they are for sale is
not one of them. Such political insulation is not a surprising
quirk; it is, as Hamilton argued in Federalist 78, the whole
point of Article III.315
To say that judges do not buy votes and sell legal outcomes
is in no way inconsistent with public choice. It does not idealize
judges. It does not even say that “ideology” or other forms of
“naked” policy preference play no role in judicial
decisionmaking.316 All it states is the rather obvious fact that,
313. See supra Part IV.
314. Cf. Demsetz, supra note 73.
315. See supra notes 277–81 and accompanying text.
316. The social science literature on the determinants of judicial decision
making—from ideology to laziness (and many other things)—is voluminous.
See, e.g., MICHAEL A. BAILEY & FORREST MALTZMAN, THE CONSTRAINED
COURT: LAW, POLITICS, AND THE DECISIONS JUSTICES MAKE (2011); EILEEN
BRAMAN, LAW, POLITICS, AND PERCEPTION: HOW POLICY PREFERENCES
INFLUENCE LEGAL REASONING (2009); PAUL M. COLLINS, JR., FRIENDS OF THE
SUPREME COURT: INTEREST GROUPS AND JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING (2008);
FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS (2007);
LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF
FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL
CHOICE (2013); JACK KNIGHT & LEE EPSTEIN, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE
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for institutional and other reasons, judges’ “preferences”
incorporate a heavy dose of law-regarding and public-regarding
considerations, to a much larger degree than, say, a typical
Congressmember under pressure by well-organized
constituents.317 And in a subject such as copyright—where
ideology does not figure prominently318 and (uniquely among
the enumerated powers) the constitutional goal is specified319—
(1997); C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL
POLITICS AND VALUES (1948); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HOWARD J. SPAETH, THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002); Chris W.
Bonneau et al., Agenda Control, the Median Justice, and the Majority Opinion
on the U.S. Supreme Court, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 890 (2007); Shai Danziger,
Jonathan Levav & Liora Avnaim-Pesso, Extraneous Factors in Judicial
Decisions, 108 PROCEEDINGS NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 6889 (2011); Andrew F.
Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Stampede to Judgment: Persuasive
Influence and Herding Behavior by Courts, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 158 (1999);
Ahmad E. Taha, Publish or Paris? Evidence of How Judges Allocate Their
Time, 6 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1 (2004). See chapter two of EPSTEIN, LANDES &
POSNER, supra, for a useful literature review. For a judge’s riposte to the
literature, see Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of
Empirical Studies That Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate
Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895 (2009).
317. The reasons for the preference structure of judges are beyond the
scope of this Article. They might include, in addition to the institutional
features of an independent judiciary, the personal inculcation of certain values
about the rule of law and what a judge’s job is. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW
JUDGES THINK 369–77 (2010).
318. That intellectual property is not an ideological subject is, as far as I
know, the majority view among practitioners, observers, and commentators,
and appears to be justified by the high incidence of unanimous or near-
unanimous opinions and the unusual coalitions of Justices in IP cases.
Rigorous empirical scholarship on the subject is still in its infancy, and the
existing studies have come up with varying conclusions. See Barton Beebe,
Does Judicial Ideology Affect Copyright Fair Use Outcomes?: Evidence From
the Fair Use Case Law, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 517, 519 (2008) (“[J]udges’
ideological preferences have no significant effect on their adjudication of the
fair use defense.”); Matthew Sag, Tonja Jacobi & Maxim Sytch, Ideology and
Exceptionalism in Intellectual Property: An Empirical Study, 97 CALIF. L. REV.
801, 851 (2009) (concluding that “ideology is a significant determinant of how
Supreme Court justices vote in relation to IP,” but that “ideology has less of an
effect on IP than other areas of the law”). For other empirical studies of
judicial decisionmaking in IP generally and copyright specifically, see Beebe,
supra note 30; Tonja Jacobi & Matthew Sag, Taking the Measure of Ideology:
Empirically Measuring Supreme Court Cases, 98 GEO. L.J. 1 (2009); Netanel,
supra note 30; Sag, supra note 30; Samuelson, supra note 30.
319. Intellectual property is unique among enumerated powers in that the
Constitution prescribes one objective for all copyright and patent legislation:
“to promote the progress of science and the useful arts.” U.S. CONST. art. I, §
8, cl. 8.
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I fail to see other forms of public choice bias that afflict the
judiciary but not Congress.
To be sure, scholars have made arguments as to why the
judicial process would be subject to capture. Elhauge argues,
for example, that (1) the same free-riding dynamics identified
by Mancur Olson would make special interest groups more
likely to devote more resources to litigation and win,320 and (2)
increasing the rulemaking power of federal judges would
increase interest group influence on judicial appointments.321
These arguments might be persuasive in some contexts; as
applied to copyright, however, they are theoretically
underdeveloped and empirically speculative.
It is unclear why free-riding dynamics would affect the
litigation process the same way as legislation. Spending on
litigation, unlike on legislation, has sharply decreasing returns
to scale. One can pay to get a lawyer with good legal skills and
large resources for factual investigation, but such costs are
affordable by many parties, as evidenced by the Eldred
challengers’ getting some of the best legal talent in the
country;322 past that threshold, increasing spending doesn’t
appreciably increase payoffs. By contrast, there is no evident
limit to productive spending to influence legislation.
Moreover, litigation affects the bottom line of at least two
affected parties in a much more direct way than other group
members. Legislation is often general, and obtaining laws
individually tailored for an actor is extremely difficult and
therefore uncommon. By contrast, it is common for litigants to
obtain individually tailored results that are unhelpful or of
uncertain application to similarly situated entities. This means
group members have less to gain from free-riding on the efforts
of others and more to lose from refraining to initiate their own
efforts, both of which reduce the incentives for free-riding.
320. See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text for a discussion of this
collective action problem.
321. See Elhauge, supra note 77, at 67, 70, 81–82.
322. Eldred’s legal team consisted of a who’s who of prominent lawyers and
legal scholars. In addition, the petitioners were supported by amici briefs
written on behalf of a number of famous scholars, including five Nobel
laureates in economics. The briefs are available at Cert Granted: Supreme
Court Will Hear Eldred v. Ashcroft in Its Fall Term, OPENLAW, HARV. U.,
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/eldredvashcroft/legal.html (last visited
Jan 13, 2015).
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Moreover, those who are sued rarely have the option of letting
other group members defend the suit for them. So the public
good aspect is less pronounced in litigation than in legislation.
The argument about interest group influence on judicial
appointments is also speculative. To begin with, life tenure
means that extracting credible commitments from federal
judges is difficult, so the likelihood of successful picking by
interest groups is low. Moreover, the evidence for such
influence is scant and does not appear extendable to copyright.
It is true, as Elhauge notes, that some federal judges are
appointed with particular attention to their views on the issue
of abortion,323 and it is possible that special interest influence
(as opposed to genuine majoritarianism) is driving that litmus
test. But the same is not true in other areas where judicial
rulemaking, whether statutory or constitutional, plays a
prominent policy role, as in antitrust law, First Amendment
law, and indeed copyright law itself. It seems implausible that
copyright would become tomorrow’s litmus test for judicial
appointments. And it would be unwise to suppose that a
demonstrably broken legislative process is the way to go
because the judicial process is not perfect.
None of this means special interests will not have
disproportionate influence in the litigation process. The
foregoing analysis shows, however, that their influence in
federal court is likely to be less than in Congress. In short,
there is no good reason to suspect that judicial rulemaking in
copyright could possibly be any worse than congressional
rulemaking. The point is not that judges are immune from
public choice (or from incentives). No one is. The point is that
the public choice problems of copyright legislation do not afflict
the adjudicatory process to nearly the same extent. So the
dynamics that privilege the interests of rightsholders over the
general public in Congress are not present to the same extent
in the federal courts.
VII. CONCLUSION
Institutions matter. Designing institution-dependent fair
use fixes without regard for real institutional dynamics is like
designing a political system without regard for real human
323. Elhauge, supra note 77, at 81.
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characteristics.324 But a prominent school of fair use criticism
has unfortunately ignored the prevailing political dynamics in
the institution that is supposed to carry out its proposed
reforms, producing legislative reform proposals that are futile
at best and counterproductive at worst. Realistic consideration
of political dynamics and past performance reveals that federal
courts are likely to be much more hospitable than Congress to
pro-user fair use reform. Moreover, philosophical and practical
objections to extensive judicial rulemaking in this area are not
persuasive. The implication for academic efforts is that a focus
on doctrinal scholarship, especially scholarship that takes into
account the now-recognized constitutional aspect of fair use, is
likely to be more fruitful. Fair use is safer in the hands of
judges. It was judges who created it, and it is judges who are
most likely to guard it. At the very least, they will not do any
worse than Congress.
324. Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 281, at 322 (James Madison)
(“It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices [as the separation
of powers and a system of checks and balances] should be necessary to control
the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of
all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be
necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls
on government would be necessary.”).
